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JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction under section 78A-4-103(2)(j) of the Utah Code.
ISSUES
1.

Hanson Equipment's negligent repair of a rental truck caused the

truck to break down on a trip from Utah to Washington and also caused
unforeseen torque to build up in the truck's drive line. Dennis Normandeau, a
tow-truck driver called to the scene, was killed when the built-up torque was
violently released as he was preparing the truck for towing. Did Hanson owe
Mr. Normandeau a duty of care?
Standard of Review: Plaintiffs agree with Hanson's statement of the
standard of review: On appeal from a summary judgment motion, the appellate
court views the facts and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party (here, the plaintiffs) and
reviews the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness.1
Preservation: Hanson preserved this issue in its motion for summary
judgment and supporting memorandum. (See Record ("R.") at 612-631.)2

1

E.g., Tallman v. City of Hurricane, 1999 UT 55, f 1, 985 P.2d 892.

2

See also Normandeau v. Hanson Equip., Inc., 2009 UT 44, % 24, 215 P.3d
152 ("We . . . hold that by moving for summary judgment on the issue of duty,
1

2.

Hanson never raised the professional rescuer doctrine as an

affirmative defense, and, in moving for summary judgment, it never mentioned
the doctrine. Hanson also failed to raise the doctrine in its briefs in this court and
in the Utah Supreme Court. Has Hanson waived its argument that a form of the
professional rescuer doctrine should apply?
Standard of Review: This court does not review issues or arguments not
preserved below, and, by failing to brief the professional rescuer doctrine on
appeal, both in this court and in the Utah Supreme Court, Hanson did not
preserve the issue.3
Preservation: The professional rescuer doctrine was not preserved for
appeal.

Hanson properly preserved that issue for appeal."). A copy of the supreme
court's opinion is included in the addendum.
3

E.g., United States v. Sears, 411 F.3d 1240,1240-41 (11th Cir. 2005) (the
appellant's failure to raise an issue in his initial brief precludes him from doing so
on remand); Princeton Biochems., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 215 F.3d 1349
(table), No. 98-1525,1999 WL 641233, slip op. at *2 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (copy
included in addendum) (a party may not raise on remand an issue not previously
appealed) (citing Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 166 F.3d 1379,1382-83 (Fed.
Cir. 1999)); United States v. Glover, 149 F. Supp. 2d 371, 378 (N.D. IU. 2001)
(ordinarily, failing to raise a ground on appeal precludes raising it on remand)
(citations omitted).
2

3.

The professional rescuer doctrine as adopted in Utah is limited to

professional rescuers who are public employees. Mr. Normandeau was not a
public employee; Hanson was not the party needing rescuing; and Hanson's
negligence not only created the need for a tow truck but also created the very
hazard that killed Mr. Normandeau. Did the trial court err in holding that the
professional rescuer doctrine does not apply under the facts of this case?
Standard of Review: If the issue had been preserved for appeal, it would
have been by Hanson's unauthorized Supplemental Briefing in Support of
Defendant's Motion for a New Trial (R. 1847-66.) A trial court's denial of a
motion for new trial is generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion.4 "However,
if the trial court has made a determination of law that provides a premise for its
denial of a new trial, such a legal decision is reviewed under a correctness
standard."5
Preservation: This issue was not preserved for appeal.6

E.g., Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425,428 (Utah 1998).
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993).
See issue no. 2, supra, & pt. II, infra.
3

DETERMINATIVE RULE
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9) is determinative of the second
issue on appeal. It is set out in the addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Prior Dispositions,
This is a wrongful death action. Hanson Equipment negligently repaired a

Ryder truck, which caused it to break down on Soldier Summit in Utah County.
The negligent repair also caused torque to build up in the drive line. The
plaintiffs' husband and father, Dennis Normandeau, was killed when that torque
was released as he was disconnecting the drive line so that he could tow the
truck.
The plaintiffs sued Hanson and other companies associated with the
design, manufacture, and lease of the truck. (R. at 1-13.) All the defendants
except Hanson were dismissed before trial. (R. at 413-14, 550, 577-78, 586-87, 60102,1398-99.) Hanson moved for summary judgment on the grounds that it owed
Mr. Normandeau no duty, that its negligence was not the proximate cause of Mr.
Normandeau's death, and that his contributory negligence was the sole
proximate cause. (R. at 612-13.) The trial court denied that motion (R. at 118284), and the case went to trial (see R. at 1689).
4

The jury returned a unanimous verdict in favor of the plaintiffs and 100
percent against Hanson. (R. at 1682-84.)
The trial court denied Hanson's motion for a new trial or, in the
alternative, for a remittitur. (R. at 2007-26.) Hanson then appealed (R. at 202829), and the appeal was poured over to this court (R. 2066-70).
This court issued an opinion affirming the jury verdict.7 A majority of the
panel did not reach the issue of whether the trial court correctly denied Hanson's
motion for summary judgment, on the grounds that the issue was "not
appealable under prior Utah case law and the facts of this case."8 One judge
dissented in part. He concluded that the court had jurisdiction to reach the
merits of Hanson's motion for summary judgment9 but would have ruled that the
trial court correctly denied that motion, since "Hanson's moving papers failed to
establish, as a matter of law, that Hanson owed no duty of care to
Normandeau."10

7

Normandeau v. Hanson Equip., Inc., 2007 UT App 382,174 P.3d 1 (a
copy of which is included in the addendum), rev'd, 2009 UT 44, 215 P.3d 152.
8

2007 UT App 382,^14.

9

Id. W 34-36 (Orme, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

10

Id. \ 37.
5

Hanson petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which
the court granted to consider whether this court erred in its construction and
application of the rules governing appellate review of denials of summary
judgment.11
After further briefing in the Utah Supreme Court, that court issued its
decision, holding that, to the extent Hanson argued in its motion for summary
judgment that it owed no duty of care to Mr. Normandeau, the motion raised a
purely legal issue that was properly preserved for appeal.12 The court remanded
the case to this court to decide "whether the district court properly ruled that
Hanson owed Mr. Normandeau a duty of care."13
B.

Statement of Facts
This statement of facts is based primarily on the facts set out in the

plaintiffs' memorandum in opposition to Hanson's motion for summary
judgment (R. 821-986), which were the facts that were before the trial court when

See Order, Mar. 7, 2008; 187 P.3d 232 (Utah 2008).
See 2009 UT 44, M 17 & 24.
Id. 125.
6

it denied Hanson's motion.

Both the trial court and appellate courts are

required to view the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from the
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party (here, the
plaintiffs).15
Dennis Normandeau was killed when he responded to a call for roadside
assistance after a Ryder rental truck broke down on Soldier Summit in Spanish
Fork Canyon. Kristen Marion had rented the truck to move her family from
Colorado to Washington. Hanson Equipment, Inc., a certified technician for
International trucks like the Ryder truck, had repaired the truck just before Ms.
Marion picked it up. The truck had been losing hydraulic fluid. The hydraulic
fluid not only provided the truck with power steering but also kept the parking
(or emergency) brake on the drive line released. The truck had a spring-applied

Similarly, Hanson takes its statement of facts primarily from its
memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment. (Compare
Appellant's Br. at 2-4 with R. 619-25.) The plaintiffs disputed some of the facts in
Hanson's statement of facts. (Compare R. 620-21, ff 5-7, with R. 831-33.) The
factual disputes are irrelevant to the issues on appeal, however, because they
went to Mr. Normandeau's alleged comparative fault in failing to check for and
relieve torque from the drive line before trying to tow the truck, an issue that the
jury decided against Hanson at trial. (See R. 1683, % 5.)
15

E.g., Estate Landscape & Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain
States Tel. & Tel. Co., 844 P.2d 322, 324 n.l (Utah 1992); Bowen v. Riverton City, 656
P.2d 434,436 (Utah 1982).
7

hydraulically released parking brake system. The parking brake was on the
drive line behind the transmission and ran off the power steering unit. Hanson
replaced part of the hose that carried the hydraulic fluid to the drive-line parking
brake. Unfortunately, Hanson did not replace the hose with an approved
replacement part or an equivalent hose. Instead, it replaced the hose with a fuel
hose that could not withstand as much pressure. It also spliced the new hose to
part of the old hose by clamping it to a threaded pipe nipple, which cut through
the new, inferior hose, causing it to leak. (See R. 840, % 1; 842-45, f f 7-15,18-23;
R. 2078, at 48:23-49:2.)
Hanson's negligent repair caused the newly spliced fuel hose to leak
within hours after the truck was on the road. The loss of hydraulic fluid caused
the parking brake to clamp down on the drive line and remain clamped, which
quickly stopped the drive line from turning. The combination of the clamped
drive-line brake and the weight and forward inertia of the truck as it came to rest
caused extreme torque to build up in the drive line. (See R. 841-42, f f 3-7; 845,
1122-24.)
The loss of hydraulic fluid from the repaired line also caused the loss of all
the hydraulically-assisted power steering for the driver.

8

As Ms. Marion drove the truck up Soldier Summit, she could feel the truck
slow down and the power steering go out. She had to pull off the road, stop, and
call for roadside assistance. (R. 844, % 17.) The vehicle could not be driven
farther and had to be towed. Dennis Normandeau was eventually sent to tow
the truck. (R. 622-23, %% 13-17.)
Before he could tow the truck, Mr. Normandeau had to disconnect the
drive line from the transmission. Because of the leak in the hose that Hanson had
spliced on, a huge amount of torque had built up in the drive line as the truck
came to a stop. As Mr. Normandeau was disconnecting the drive line, this builtup energy was released violently, causing a part of the yoke on the differential at
the rear of the drive line to break off. Either the yoke or the drive line hit Mr.
Normandeau in the head, killing him instantly. (R. 845-46, Tl 24-28; 848,f34.)
Mr. Normandeau's heirs sued Hanson, among others, claiming that its
negligence was a cause of Mr. Normandeau's death. (R. 1-13.) Hanson moved
for summary judgment on the grounds that it owed Mr. Normandeau no duty
because he was "an unforeseeable plaintiff," that its negligent repair could not
be a proximate cause of his death, and that his own negligence was a superseding
cause of his death. (R. 612-13.) The plaintiffs opposed the motion on the grounds

9

that, among other things, Hanson owed Mr. Normandeau a duty of care. (R.
852.)
The plaintiffs pointed out that one who negligently repairs a chattel can be
liable to those who it should expect to use the chattel or be endangered by its
probable use. (See R. 854-57.) The parties agreed that the foreseeability of harm
is a major factor in determining whether one person owes another a duty of care
(see R. 628-29, 857), and Hanson did not dispute that the foreseeability of harm to
Mr. Normandeau was "'a triable issue of fact.'" (R. 858 (footnote omitted).)
At the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, Hanson agreed that
the question of duty in this case hinged on the foreseeability of harm to Mr.
Normandeau. (R. 2078 at 29:5-7 ("What we're saying is . . . it was just not
foreseeable that this particular accident would have arisen ..."); 33:25-34:2
("There really aren't any other factors to consider in this case as to whether a
duty was owed, except for the foreseeability.").16 Hanson also agreed that it was
foreseeable that if it did a negligent repair, the hose could fail, the vehicle would
"end up going into self-preservation and pulling over to the side of the road," the

16

Hanson also acknowledged that foreseeability applied not only to
the issue of duty but also to causation. (R. 2078 at 40:25-41:2.) As applied to
causation, the jury found against Hanson on the issue of foreseeability. (See R.
1682, f 2.)
10

occupants of the vehicle could be injured, other people on the road could be
injured, and the vehicle would have to be towed. (R. 2078 at 34:3-18; 35:1-14;
41:14-42:1,16-19.) Hanson also agreed that it was foreseeable that, to tow the
vehicle, the drive line would have to be disconnected, and it did not dispute that
there could be built-up torque in the drive line. (R. 2078 at 35:15-19; 36:4-37:10.)
The only thing that Hanson claimed was unforeseeable was that a tow truck
driver like Mr. Normandeau would not prepare the truck properly for towing.
(R. 2078 at 34:18-25; 37:11-14; 42:19-22; 51:21-24.)
The trial court understood the facts of the case as follows:
[I]t seems to me t h a t . . . when that hose fails, we end up with a lock
on the drive shaft; and that can potentially be a very dangerous
situation, and it's caused—that is caused by the failure of the hose.
The guy [Mr. Normandeau] goes in. He . . . may be negligent,
maybe he isn't, I don't [know], but anyway, he's killed by that
dangerous condition that exists because of the failure of the hose.
(R. 2078 at 38:18-25.) In denying Hanson's motion for summary judgment, the
court said:
I just feel that based on my understanding of the mechanics here—
and . . . I'm not saying that I'm infallible on that, but based on my
understanding of mechanics, it just seems to me that the failure of
the hose exposes the tow truck driver who's got to disconnect, if he's
going to tow, the drive shaft, to a hazardous situation. That
hazardous situation, it seems, is . . . directly caused by the failure of
the hydraulics. So I'm going to deny . . . the motion for summary
judgment on that.
11

(R. 2078 at 53:25-54:9.)
The case went to trial, and the jury returned a unanimous verdict finding
that Hanson's negligence was the sole proximate cause of Mr. Normandeau's
death. (R. 1682-83.)
Hanson filed a post-judgment motion for a new trial (R. 1692-94), which
the plaintiffs opposed (R. 1805-43). Hanson then filed, without leave of court, a
"Supplemental Briefing in Support of Defendant's Motion for a New Trial" (R.
1847-66), raising, for the first time, the issue of whether the plaintiffs' claim was
barred by the so-called professional-rescuer doctrine.17 The trial court denied
Hanson's motion for a new trial. (See R. 1949; 2007-26.)
Hanson appealed. (R. 2028-29.) In its docketing statement in this court,
Hanson stated as one of the issues for appeal, "Does the professional rescuer
doctrine . . . bar plaintiff's claims against Hanson?"18 But Hanson never
mentioned the doctrine again, through three rounds of briefing (its briefs in this
court, its petition for a writ of certiorari, and its briefs in the Utah Supreme

17

Hanson later sought leave of court to file its supplemental brief. (R.
1941-42.) The trial court did not expressly grant that motion, but it considered
Hanson's supplemental briefing and the plaintiffs' responsive memorandum in
denying Hanson's motion for a new trial. (See R. 2009, % 8.)
18

Docketing Statement, dated Aug. 25, 2006, at 3, f (c)(7)(iii).
12

Court), until its most recent brief, filed on remand to this court on October 26,
2009.
Instead, Hanson raised many other arguments on appeal. The only one
that is still at issue is whether the trial court erred in granting Hanson's motion
for summary judgment on the issue of duty. All of Hanson's other arguments
have been decided against Hanson.19
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court did not err in denying Hanson's motion for summary
judgment on the issue of duty. As Judge Orme concluded the first time around,
"Hanson's moving papers failed to establish, as a matter of law, that Hanson
"20 Hanson's negligent repair not only

owed no duty of care to Normandeau

caused the Ryder truck to break down, so it had to be towed, but also caused an
excessive amount of torque to build up in the drive line. It was undisputed that,
before he could tow the truck, Mr. Normandeau had to disconnect the drive line.
When he did, the excessive torque that had built up in the drive line as a direct

See Normandeau, 2007 UT App 382, <0 7-10,15-32.
See id. f 37 (Orme, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
13

and proximate result of Hanson's negligent repair was released violently, killing
Mr. Normandeau.
The law is well established that one who negligently repairs a chattel can
be liable to those who it should expect to use the chattel or be endangered by its
probable use. Mr. Normandeau was a foreseeable plaintiff, to whom Hanson
owed a duty of care. There is no public policy reason to shift the loss caused by
Mr. Normandeau's death from Hanson, the culpable party, to Mr. Normandeau's
widow and children. Therefore, under the facts of this case, the trial court did
not err in denying Hanson's motion for summary judgment. (Pt. I.)
Hanson suggests that the professional rescuer doctrine should bar the
plaintiffs' claim. The court should not reach Hanson's professional rescuer
argument because the argument was not before the trial court when it denied
Hanson's motion for summary judgment, was not properly preserved for appeal
(pt. II), and does not apply in this case in any event (pt. III).

14

ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED HANSON'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE ISSUE OF DUTY.
A.

Hanson Owed Mr. Normandeau a Duty of Care on the Facts of This
CaseHanson tries to reduce this case to a single, abstract proposition, namely,

that a repair shop does not owe a duty of care to a tow truck driver.21 Hanson
argues that it does not have such a duty because the relationship between a
repair shop and a tow truck driver is too attenuated, and any harm to a tow truck
driver resulting from a negligent repair is unforeseeable. By framing the issue
this way, Hanson tries to avoid one of the central facts of this case, namely, that
Hanson's negligent repair of the Ryder truck's hydraulic line did not just cause
the truck to break down, requiring the services of a tow truck driver, but also
created the very hazard that killed Mr. Normandeau. For that reason, Hanson's
assertion that "[t]he mere furnishing of the necessity of needing a repair person is

See, e.g., Appellant's Br. at 1, 2, 5,16.
15

not sufficient to impose a duty" 22 is irrelevant, since Hanson's negligence did
much more than that.
The issue before the trial court was not the abstract issue of whether a
repair shop owes a duty to a tow truck driver but whether Hanson owed a duty
of care to Mr. Normandeau under the facts of this case.
Hanson claims that the plaintiffs' only claim against it was that it
negligently repaired the truck, causing the truck "to break down under
circumstances that required it to be towed." 23 In fact, the plaintiffs claimed that
that was just one of the ways in which Hanson and the other defendants were
negligent. (R. 190-91, % 59 (the defendants' negligence "included, but is not limited
to," certain enumerated acts) (emphasis added).) The evidence developed

22

Id. at 8 (citing Bryant v. Glastetter, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 291 (Ct. App.),
review denied (Cal. 1995), and Sanders v. Posi-Seal Int'l, 668 So.2d 742 (La. Ct. App.),
writ denied, 672 So.2d 924 (La. 1996)). In Bryant, the defendant's negligence in
driving while intoxicated only put the plaintiffs decedent (a tow truck driver) in
a position where he was injured by the independent negligence of another driver.
Other than making it more probable that the decedent would be in the place
where the accident occurred, the defendant's negligence had nothing to do with
the accident. See 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 295, 296. Sanders is also distinguishable. That
case involved the question of whether one repairperson owes a duty to a
subsequent repairperson hired to make the repaired part "like new." See 668
So.2d at 747. Mr. Normandeau was not hired to repair Hanson's shoddy work
but was only hired to tow the truck to a place where the part could be repaired.
23

Appellant's Br. at 4; see also R. 190-91, at \ 59(c).
16

through discovery showed that Hanson's negligent repair of the truck not only
caused the truck to break down on the side of the road, requiring that it be
towed, but also caused the parking brake to clamp down on the drive line while
the drive line was turning. Hanson's negligence not only brought the truck to a
stop but also caused a huge amount of unseen torque to build up in the drive
line, which was violently released when Mr. Normandeau tried to prepare the
truck for towing. (See, e.g., R. 807-09, f l 3-12.) Thus, Hanson's negligent repair
of the hose created the very hazard that killed Mr. Normandeau.
Hanson claims that, under "traditional negligence analysis," a vehicle
repair shop owes no duty of care to a tow truck driver.24 Hanson also claims that
the plaintiffs "do not state what legal duty was owed to" their decedent.25
In fact, traditional negligence law shows that Hanson owed Mr.
Normandeau a duty of care. The duty Hanson owed to Mr. Normandeau is the
duty that all people owe to others~a duty to use reasonable care to avoid causing

Appellants' Br. at 5.
Id. at 6.
17

them harm: 'The default rule is that everyone owes a duty of reasonable care to
others to avoid physical harms/' 2 6

26

1 D A N B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 227 (Supp. 2008) (footnote
omitted). See also id. § 117, at 277 (2001) (as a general rule, all people owe a duty
"to exercise the care that would be exercised by a reasonable and prudent person
under the same or similar circumstances to avoid or minimize risks of harm to
others") (footnotes omitted); Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 818
(E.D.N.Y. 1999) ("In the usual run of cases, a general duty to avoid negligence is
assumed, and there is no need for the court to undertake detailed analysis of
precedent and policy.") (citations omitted), vacated, 264 F.3d 1 (2d Cir. 2001), and
effectively overruled on the merits by Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d
1055 (N.Y. 2001); Lugtu v. California Highway Patrol, 28 P.3d 249, 256 (Cal. 2001)
("Under general negligence principles,... a person ordinarily is obligated to
exercise due care in his or her own actions so as to not create an unreasonable
risk of injury to others"); Neighbarger v. Irwin Indus., Inc., 882 P.2d 347, 350 (Cal.
1994) ("We all have the duty to use due care to avoid injuring others.") (citation
omitted); Remy v. MacDonald, 801 N.E.2d 260, 262-23 (Mass. 2004) ("As a general
principle of tort law, every actor has a duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid
physical harm to others."); Iglehart v. Board of County Comm'rs, 2002 OK 76,110,
60 P.3d 497 (recognizing ''the traditional common-law rule that whenever one
person is by circumstances placed in such a position with regard to another, that,
if he . . . did not use ordinary care and skill in his . . . own conduct, he would
cause danger of injury to the person or property of the other, a duty arises to use
ordinary care and skill to avoid such danger"); Wolford v. Eastern State Hosp., 795
P.2d 516, 519 (Okla. 1990) ("As a general rule a 'defendant owes a duty of care to
all persons who are foreseeably endangered by his conduct with respect to all
risks which make the conduct unreasonably dangerous/") (citations omitted).

See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)

OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM

§ 6 cmt. b

(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2005) ("Ordinarily, an actor whose conduct creates risks of
physical harm to others has a duty to exercise reasonable care."). Cf Palsgrafv.
Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99,103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting) ("Every
one owes to the world at large the duty of refraining from those acts that may
unreasonably threaten the safety of others.").
18

Courts usually constrict this general duty of care in very limited
circumstances: 27
(1) when the plaintiff claims economic or dignitary harm, not
personal injury or property damage; (2) when the defendant is
perceived as having committed no relevant affirmative act; (3) when
the defendant's duty is thought to be based upon his special
relationship or undertaking; (4) when a duty to the plaintiff would
potentially conflict with a preexisting duty to another; and (5) when
the courts believe they know that the plaintiff has consented to some
inherent risk in dealing with the defendant. 28
None of these situations exist in this case. The plaintiffs were not claiming
economic or dignitary harm; the harm they suffered was the death of their
husband and father. The defendant's liability was not based on its failure to act
but on its affirmative acts in negligently repairing the hydraulic line on the Ryder
truck. The defendant's duty was not based on a special relationship. 29

27

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES § 6

(Discussion Draft Apr. 5,1999) ("Findings of no duty are unusual, and are based
on judicial recognition of special problems of principle or policy that justify the
withholding of liability/').
28

1 DOBBS, supra note 26, § 227 (Supp. 2008) (footnotes omitted).
Although courts sometime say that the defendant owed the plaintiff "no duty" in
such cases, "they usually mean only that the defendant owed no duty that was
breached or that he owed no duty that was relevant on the facts." Id.
29

For that reason, the special relationship cases that Hanson relied on
before the trial court {see R. 627-28) and in point LC of its brief are irrelevant. See
Normandeau, 2009 UT 44, % 21 ("in this case, there is no specific relationship test
to be applied to determine whether Hanson owed Mr. Normandeau a duty").
19

Recognizing that Hanson owed Mr. Normandeau a duty would not conflict with
a preexisting duty to anyone else but is consistent with the duties that Hanson
admits it owed to others. And Mr. Normandeau did not consent to any inherent
risk in dealing with Hanson.
Hanson claims that, "[i]n wrestling with whether a duty was owed in this
case, the Utah Supreme Court provided some guidance to the analysis of when a
duty is created/730 The Utah Supreme Court did not "wrestle" with whether a
duty was owed in this case. It left that issue for this court to decide. It merely
held that Hanson had properly preserved the issue for appeal.
The supreme court did say, however: "A court determines whether a duty
exists by analyzing [1] the legal relationship between the parties, [2] the
f oreseeability of injury, [3] the likelihood of injury, [4] public policy as to which
party can best bear the loss occasioned by the injury, and [5] other general policy

The specific relationship cases apply when the plaintiff is claiming that the
defendant is liable for failing to perform a gratuitous undertaking or failing to
control the conduct of a third person. See, e.g., Webb v. University of Utah, 2005 UT
80, % 10,125 P.3d 906; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 12, topic 7, scope note
(1963 & 1964). Those are not the plaintiffs' claims in this case. The plaintiffs'
claim is that Hanson's own negligence in performing a task for which it was
compensated (see R. 116, % 15, & 118) caused the death of their husband and
father.
30

Appellant's Br. at 6.
20

considerations/'31 All of those factors support the trial court's conclusion that
Hanson owed Mr. Normandeau a duty on the facts of this case.
1.

The Legal Relationship Between the Parties.

The fact that Hanson and Mr. Normandeau did not have a preexisting
relationship does not mean that Hanson owed Mr. Normandeau no duty of care.
The existence of a relationship between the parties "is usually one of the grounds
for imposing a duty of reasonable care, but the absence of a relationship is usually not
a ground for ruling out a duty of care. "32
Negligence law, as originally developed at common law, was initially
reserved for consented-to contacts that went awry. Thus, it originally involved
parties who had some relationship to each other, by contract or status.33 But by

31

2009 UT 44, % 19 (citing AMS Salt Indus. Inc. v. Magnesium Corp. of
Am., 942 P.2d 315, 321 (Utah 1997)). Professor Dobbs has noted that such factors,
variously stated by different courts, "are so numerous and so broadly stated that
they can lead to almost any conclusion.... More importantly,... they are
mainly the very same factors that determine the negligence question." 1 DOBBS,
supra note 26, § 229, at 583 (2001). Professor Dobbs concludes: "Given the
similarity between the duty factors decided by the judge and the negligence
factors decided by the jury, it may be appropriate to wonder whether judges are
in a position to shape refined limited duty rules without taking over the jury
role." Id.
32

1 DOBBS, supra note 26, § 229, at 179 (Supp. 2008) (emphasis added).

33

See generally id. § 111 (2001).
21

the 1800s, negligence law had been extended to strangers, and "the negligence
standard necessarily cease[d] to arise from the parties' relationship."34 Thus, as
Hanson conceded at the hearing on its motion for summary judgment, Hanson
could be liable to the occupants of the vehicle, to other motorists, to pedestrians,
and to owners of other vehicles parked on the side of the road—all people with
whom Hanson had no relationship—if its negligent repair caused the driver of the
truck to lose control over the vehicle. (R. 629 & R. 2078, at 34:11-20,41:14-42:1.)
In any event, there was a relationship between Hanson and Mr.
Normandeau-that of a repairer of a chattel and one whom the repairer should
expect to use it or be endangered by its probable use.
The law is well settled that one who repairs a product owes a duty to those
who could foreseeably be injured by a negligent repair.35 And, as explained in

34

Id. at 262.

35

E.g., Winans v. Rockwell lut'l Corp., 705 F.2d 1449,1453 (5th Cir. 1983)
(repairers of products are required to use reasonable care in proportion to the
foreseeable danger) (applying Louisiana law); Vrooman v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 183
F.2d 479, 481 (10th Cir. 1950) ("the rule of liability has been made generally
applicable to one who, as an independent contractor negligently . . . repairs a
chattel for another") (citations omitted); Levine v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 200 F. Supp.
2d 180,186-87 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (a person who undertakes repairs has a duty of
care to act reasonably to protect against foreseeable risks) (applying New York
law); Seo v. All-Makes Overhead Doors, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 160,169 (Ct. App. 2002)
("An independent contractor repairer may owe a duty to a third party injured by
22

the next section, Mr. Normandeau was someone who could foreseeably be
injured by a negligent repair.

the equipment repaired if . . . the repairer negligently performs the repair causing
the third party's injury"); Jackson v. Ryder Truck Rental Inc., 20 CaL Rptr. 2d 913,
(Ct. App.) (contractor who failed to maintain the electrical system of a truck,
causing the truck driver to have to stop by the side of the road, where he was hit
and killed by another car, owed a duty of care to the driver), review denied (CaL
1993); Moody v. Martin Motor Co., 46 S.E.2d 197, 200 (Ga. Ct. App. 1948) ("an
independent contractor who repairs an article or machine" "owes an original
duty . . . not to endanger the lives and limbs of others by the negligent
performance of a contract, when the consequences of such conduct may be
foreseen"); Central & S. Truck Lines v. Westfall GMC Truck, Inc., 317 S.W.2d 841,
844-46 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958) (independent contractors can be liable to third parties
for negligent repairs to motor vehicles) (citations omitted); Zierer v. Daniels, 122
A.2d 377, 378-79 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1956) ("he who repairs a chattel is
bound to exercise reasonable care not to cause bodily harm or damage to one
whose person or property may reasonably be expected to be endangered by the
probable use of the chattel after the making of the repair"; "[ujnder this rule, one
who negligently repairs an automobile at the request of the owner had been held
liable to a third person."); Barnhart v. Freeman Equip. Co., 441 P.2d 993, 997 (Okla.
1968) (a repairer owes a duty to foreseeable users of the product to perform the
repairs properly). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 404 (one who
negligently repairs a chattel is subject to the same liability as a negligent
manufacturer of the chattel); 395 (one who negligently manufactures a chattel
that is dangerous unless carefully made is subject to liability to those who use it
for a purpose for which the manufacturer should expect it to be used and to those
whom he should expect to be endangered by its probable use); 398 (a
manufacturer of a chattel made under a plan or design that makes it dangerous
for the uses for which it is manufactured is subject to liability to others whom he
should expect to use the chattel or be endangered by its probable use).
23

2.

The Foreseeability of Injury

Hanson's main argument before the trial court was that the injury to Mr.
Normandeau was not foreseeable. (E.g., R. 2078, at 33:25-34:2 ('There really
aren't any other factors to consider in this case as to whether a duty was owed,
except for the foreseeability."). What is required to be foreseeable is the general
nature of the harm, not the specific mechanism of the harm or the particular
accident.36
Hanson conceded that it was foreseeable that, if it did a negligent repair,
the hose would fail and that the truck would go into "self-preservation" mode
and pull over to the side of the road (R. 2078, at 34:3-10); that the vehicle would
have to be towed (R. 2078, at 35:1-14, 42:16-17); that, before it could be towed, the
drive line would have to be disconnected (R. 2078, at 35:15-19, 36:4-8); and that,
because of the way the truck was designed, there could be substantial torque on
the drive line (R. 2078, at 36:9-18). As an authorized dealer, supplier, and

36

Normandeau, 2009 UT 44, f 20. See also Bigbee v. Pacific Tel & Tel Co.,
665 P.2d 947, 952 (Cal. 1983) ("'foreseeability is not to be measured by what is
more probable than not, but includes whatever is likely enough in the setting of
modern life that a reasonably thoughtful [person] would take account of it in
guiding practical conduct.... One may be held accountable for creating even
'"the risk of a slight possibility of injury if a reasonably prudent [person] would
not do so."'") (citations omitted).
24

repairer of the type of truck involved in this case (e.g., R. 2082, at 122:18-123:7; R.
2078, at 48:23-49:2), Hanson knew or should have known that a negligent repair
of the hose would cause excessive torque to build up in the drive line.
The only thing that Hanson claimed was unforeseeable was that Mr.
Normandeau would not do his job right by checking for and releasing the builtup torque in the drive line before trying to tow the truck. (See R. 2078, at 34:1825; 37:11-22; 42:19-22, 51:21-24.) There were disputed issues of material fact as to
whether Mr. Normandeau was or should have been aware of the tremendous
additional torque that would be present in the drive line as a result of Hanson's
negligent repair (see, e.g., R. 813-14, %% 5-12) and whether he checked for and
tried to release the torque in the drive line before towing the vehicle (see R. 814,
%% 10 & 12; 831-39; 846-51), precluding summary judgment on that ground. The
trial court properly let that issue go to the jury, and the jury found against
Hanson on that issue. It found that Mr. Normandeau was not negligent in the
way he went about his job. (See R. 1683,15.) In any event, a subsequent
negligent (or even criminal) act of another is not unforeseeable as a matter of

37

E.g., Cruz v. Middlekauff Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 909 P.2d 1252,1255-57
(Utah 1996); Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 728-29 (Utah 1985); Godesky v. Provo
25

3.

The Likelihood of Injury

Hanson's negligence increased the likelihood of injury to someone in Mr.
Normandeau's position, that is, the chance that he would be injured.38
For purposes of its summary judgment motion, Hanson did not dispute
that its repair of the hose in the Ryder truck was negligent. (See, e.g., R. 631.)
Hanson's negligent repair caused the truck's hydraulic line to leak, and the loss
of hydraulic fluid not only caused the truck to lose power steering but also
caused the drive-line parking brake to engage, which stopped the drive line from
turning and caused torque to build up in the drive line. Because of Hanson's
negligent repair, the truck had to be towed. And before he could tow the truck,
Mr. Normandeau had to disengage the drive line. The substantial built-up and
unseen torque in the drive line created a significant risk of harm to anyone
working on or near the drive line. (See R. 808-09, Tl 8-13.) It was "very, very
common" for a tow-truck driver to try to remove the drive line the way Mr.

City Corp., 690 P.2d 541, 545 (Utah 1984); Harris v. Utah Transit Auth., 671 P.2d
217, 222 (Utah 1983); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 447-49.
38

See, e.g., Cambridge Dictionaries Online ("likelihood" means "the
chance that something will happen"), on-line at
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp?key=46204&dict=CALD (last visited
Dec. 7, 2009).
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Normandeau did. (R. 847, % 31; 908, at 102:4-12.) Thus, injury to someone in Mr.
Normandeau' s place was more likely than an injury to others to whom Hanson
conceded it owed a duty—the occupants of the vehicle and other motorists.
4.

Public Policy as to Which Party Can Best Bear the Loss

Hanson argues:
To extend a duty of care to a tow truck driver due to negligent
repairs made by a mechanic would essentially burden mechanics
shop[s] with the obligation to compensate tow truck drivers for
injuries suffered while doing their job. Repair shops are not insurers
of tow truck drivers—to operate, towers are required to purchase
hefty insurance policies for their hazardous jobs, and the onus of
responsibility for following proper procedure is best placed on
them.39
To find that Hanson owed Mr. Normandeau a duty in this case would not
make repair shops insurers for tow truck drivers any more than finding that a
repair shop that negligently fixes a car's brakes is an insurer for all other
motorists and pedestrians on the road. In each case, the repair shop is only liable
for the injuries its negligence proximately causes. That is the public policy behind
tort law—to hold tortfeasors accountable for the harm caused by their own fault.40

39

Appellant's Br. at 9.

40

See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-5-818 & -820. See also, e.g., State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co. ofS.E., 631 So.2d 30, 32 (La. Ct. App.) ("To
place the primary liability for an accident upon the party who is the most
27

Public policy dictates that, as between a negligent tortfeasor and an innocent
plaintiff, the loss should fall on the tortfeasor.41
There is absolutely no evidence or foundation for Hanson's bald assertion
that "towers are required to purchase hefty insurance policies for their hazardous
jobs," and Hanson cites no authority for its assertion. Similarly, there is no
evidence that Mr. Normandeau was covered by insurance. If his employer was
in fact "required to purchase hefty insurance policies" covering its towing
operations, that insurance would not have provided coverage for Mr.
Normandeau or his heirs. Their exclusive remedy against Mr. Normandeau's
employer is workers' compensation.42
Moreover, whatever liability insurance Mr. Normandeau's employer may
have had would not have covered harm caused by Hanson's fault.
responsible for the loss and who was in the best position to have avoided the
incident could be considered sound public policy which encourages the negligent
party to exercise due care.") (citation omitted), writ denied, 635 So.2d 1108 (La.
1994); Nabors Drilling, U.S.A., Inc. v. Escoto, 288 S.W.3d 401,404 (Tex. 2009) ("'the
public policy behind the law of negligence . . . dictates every person is
responsible for injuries which are the reasonably foreseeable consequence of his
act or omission'") (citation omitted).
41

See Fordham v. Oldroyd, 2007 UT 74, % 17,171 P.3d 411 (referring to
"the foundational tort law principle that, as between an innocent party and a
negligent one the loss should fall on the negligent party").
42

See UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-105(l).
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If the existence of insurance for the death of Mr. Normandeau is relevant at
all, it favors finding a duty on the part of Hanson. While there was no evidence
that Mr. Normandeau's employer was heavily insured, Hanson is fully insured
for its liability to the plaintiffs.43
But the existence or nonexistence of insurance here is irrelevant. In a case
like this the law does not take into consideration whether or not the plaintiff had
insurance in holding wrongdoers accountable for the harm they have caused.44
Taken to its logical extreme, Hanson's argument would mean that no driver
would owe any duty of care to any other driver on the road because all drivers
are required to buy insurance for the hazardous activity of driving a car.45

See Def. Hanson Equip. Inc/s Mem. in Supp. of Its Mot. to Stay
Execution of Judg't Pending Appeal, filed Apr. 30, 2007, and included in vol. 5 of
the Record, at 2, % 2 ("Defendant Hanson Equipment is insured with Harco
National Insurance Company, and the amount of the judgment was within
Hanson Equipment's insurance policy limit/').
44

See, e.g., DuBois v. Nye, 584 P.2d 823, 825 (Utah 1978) (a defendant
cannot avoid liability on the ground that the damage he caused has been paid by
insurance; the collateral source rule "provides that a wrongdoer is not entitled to
have damages, for which he is liable, reduced by proof that the plaintiff has
received or will receive compensation or indemnity for the loss from an
independent collateral source").
45

See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 41-12a-301(2)-(4) & -103(9).
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Hanson's argument that "the onus of responsibility for following proper
procedure is best placed on" tow truck drivers is similarly unavailing. The
plaintiffs are not trying to hold Hanson liable for any harm caused by Mr.
Normandeau not "following proper procedure." Whatever harm Mr.
Normandeau caused himself is not Hanson's responsibility.46 In any event, the
jury found that Mr. Normandeau was not at fault in causing his death but that
Hanson bore sole responsibility for his death. (R. 1683, % 7.)
In short, public policy does not demand that, as between a negligent
tortfeasor who is fully insured for any liability and the widow and children of the
man killed by the tortfeasor's negligence, the widow and children "can best bear
the loss occasioned by the injury."47
5.

Other General Policy Considerations

Hanson has not identified any other policy considerations that would
justify shifting responsibility for its negligence from Hanson, the tortfeasor, to
Mr. Normandeau's widow and children, and the plaintiffs are not aware of any.

See id. §§ 78B-5-818 & -820.
See Normandeau, 2009 UT 44, % 19.
30

B.

Hanson's "Case on Point" Is Not.
Hanson claims that Reimer v. City of Crookston48 is ''on point" in holding

that a prior repair shop owes no duty of care to subsequent mechanics.
Curiously, if Hanson thought Reimer was "on point," one would have thought
that it would have cited it more than in a single, passing "See, e.g.," reference in
the six briefs it has already filed on appeal (two in this court the first time
around, its petition for writ of certiorari and reply, and its brief and reply brief in
the Utah Supreme Court).49 As Hanson itself recognizes,50 Reimer is
distinguishable on its facts.
In that case, Mr. Reimer, a boiler repair expert, was badly burned when he
accidentally brushed up against a corroded nipple on a school swimming pool
boiler and the nipple broke off, spraying Mr. Reimer with pressurized hot water
and steam. Mr. Reimer sued, among others, Johnson Controls, a company that
had performed previous maintenance services on the boiler. However, none of

48

326 F.3d 957 (8th Cir. 2003).

49

See Appellant's Br., Jan. 19, 2007, at 17 (citing Reimer for the
proposition that the "fact that on occasion defendant would do work on [a] boiler
does not create a duty on its part to anyone down the line who may be harmed
by the boiler").
50

See Appellant's Br., Oct. 26, 2009, at 10.
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those repairs involved the corroded nipple—the part that broke.51 In fact, earlier
that day, the head custodian for the school had asked a Johnson employee to
tighten the nipple, and the employee refused because the nipple was corroded
and appeared unsafe; moreover, it was not part of his contract-related
maintenance work.52 The court held that Johnson Controls could not be liable
because it was not responsible for the corroded nipple that broke.53 Hanson
concedes as much, but claims "this is of no consequence/'54
Unlike Hanson's repair in this case, Johnson Controls' work in Reimer had
nothing to do with the part that failed and did not directly cause the failure. It
would take a major extension of tort law to hold a repairman liable in negligence
for the failure of a part it had nothing to do with. Hanson, on the other hand, was
responsible for the part that broke (the hose that carried the hydraulic fluid for
the parking brake and power steering). Hanson's negligent repair caused the

51

See 326 F.3d at 965 ("It is undisputed that the contract did not
include repair or maintenance of the boiler nipples nor did Johnson Controls ever
work on the nipple that caused Mr. Reimer's injury").
52

See id. at 960.

53

See id. at 965-66.

54

Appellants' Br. at 10 ("Johnson Controls' repairman never worked
on the part that broke and caused injury, but this is of no consequence.").
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hose to fail, which directly caused drive-line torque to build up and also required
that the drive line be disconnected. The jury found that Hanson's negligent
repair was the proximate cause of Mr. Normandeau's death.
Other courts have had little trouble recognizing that one who repairs a
product owes a duty to those who could foreseeably be injured by a negligent
repair.55
II.
HANSON HAS WAIVED ANY ARGUMENT BASED ON
THE PROFESSIONAL RESCUER DOCTRINE.
Hanson argues that the so-called professional rescuer doctrine is
"[a]nalagous" [sic] to this case.56 Hanson is precluded from even making this
argument.
Hanson never raised the professional rescuer doctrine as an affirmative
defense. (See R. 304-18.) In moving for summary judgment, Hanson never
mentioned the professional rescuer doctrine, either in its briefs or in its oral
argument. (See R. 612-37; 2078.) Although Utah had not officially adopted the

See supra note 35 and authorities cited therein.
Appellants' Br. at 12.
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professional rescuer doctrine at that time, it was a well-recognized doctrine of
tort law that Hanson could have argued for.57
After the case was tried to a jury and a judgment was entered, Hanson
moved for a new trial or for a remittitur but did not raise the professional rescuer
doctrine in its post-judgment motion either. (See R. 1692-94.) After the plaintiffs
had responded to that motion and after the time for moving for a new trial had
passed,58 Hanson filed, without leave of court, a "Supplemental Briefing in
Support of Defendant's Motion for a New Trial/' raising for the first time the
issue of the professional rescuer doctrine (see R. 1847-52), even though it had
nothing to do with any of the grounds that Hanson had moved for a new trial on

57

See Fordham v. Oldroyd, 2006 UT App 50, J 10,131 P.3d 280 ('Tor
over a century, this rule has been adopted by the vast majority of jurisdictions
that have considered it."), aff'd, 2007 UT 74,171 P.3d 411. See also Fordham, 2007
UT 74, % 22 (Wilkins, Assoc. C.J., concurring & dissenting) (noting that the
concept first arose in 1892, in Gibson v. Leonard, 32 N.E. 182 (111. 1892), overruled by
Dim v. Naiditch, 170 N.E.2d 881 (111. I960)).
58

See UTAH R. CIV. P. 59(b) (a motion for new trial must be served
within 10 days after entry of the judgment).
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(cf. R. 1692-94).59 The trial court denied Hanson's motion on the merits, finding
the doctrine inapplicable in this case. (See R. 2024-25, Tl 29-34.)
Hanson appealed. In its docketing statement on appeal, Hanson stated one
of the issues for appeal as, "Does the professional rescuer doctrine, adopted by
the Utah Court of Appeals in Fordham v. Oldroyd, 2006 UT App 50,131 P.3d 280,
certorari [sic] granted 138 P.3d 589, bar plaintiffs claims against Hanson?"60
Curiously, however, Hanson never mentioned the doctrine again until it filed its
latest brief, after remand from the Utah Supreme Court. Hanson had eight
opportunities to raise the doctrine after mentioning it in its docketing statement,
but it never did—not in its opening brief in this court, not in its reply brief in this
court, not at oral argument in this court, not in its petition for a writ of certiorari,
not in its reply brief on its petition for a writ of certiorari, not in its principal brief
in the Utah Supreme Court, not in its reply brief in the Utah Supreme Court, and

59

Cf. Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 4,27 F.2d 1273,1276
(3d Cir. 1970) (a court is without authority to grant a new trial for reasons
assigned after the mandatory 10-day period for moving for a new trial under rule
59(b)); Brest v. Philadelphia Transit Co., 24 F.R.D. 47,48 (E.D. Pa. 1959) ("it is plain
that under [rule 59(b)]... additional reasons for a new trial served later than ten
days have no effect and cannot be considered by the Court").
60

Docketing Statement at 3, i (c)(7)(iii).
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not at oral argument in the Utah Supreme Court. Hanson's efforts to resurrect
the issue now are too little too late.
It is well established that issues not properly raised in the trial court may
not be raised for the first time on appeal,61 and "reference to an issue in post-trial
motions is insufficient to raise an issue not previously raised/'62 Moreover, issues
not raised in the court of appeals may not be raised on certiorari to the supreme
court;63 and issues not previously raised on appeal may not be raised on
remand.64 As the Federal Circuit has explained, appellate courts sit to review
judgments, not opinions:
This responsibility can be properly discharged only if the court
assumes that the appellant has fully set forth its attack on the
judgment below . . . . In other words, the court is entitled to assume
that an appellant has raised all issues it deems important against a
judgment appealed from. An issue that falls within the scope of the

61

E.g., State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), cert, denied, 931
P.2d 146 (Utah 1997).
62

LeBaron & Assocs. v. Rebel Enters., Inc., 823 P.2d 479,484 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991) (citations omitted).
63

E.g., DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428,444 (Utah 1995).

64

See supra note 3 and cases cited therein.
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judgment appealed from but is not raised by the appellant in its
opening brief on appeal is necessarily waived.65
'To hold otherwise/' the court explained,
would allow appellants to present appeals in a piecemeal and
repeated fashion, and would lead to the untenable result that "a
party who has chosen not to argue a point on a first appeal should
stand better as regards the law of the case than one who had argued
and lost/'66
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9) requires the argument section of
a brief on appeal to "contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with
respect to the issues presented,... with citations to the authorities, statutes, and
parts of the record relied on." Hanson never raised the professional rescuer
doctrine in any of its briefs on appeal. It has therefore waived the issue.67 To
Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 166 F.3d 1379,1383 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
66

Id. at 1382-83 (quoting Fogel v. Chestnutt, 668 F.2d 100,109 (2d Cir.
1981), cert denied, 459 U.S. 828 (1982)).
67

Cf. Guttman v. New Mexico, 325 Fed. Appx. 687, 693 (10th Cir. 2009)
(even though Younger abstention may be raised for the first time on appeal, the
defendant waived its abstention argument by not raising it when it had
"numerous opportunities" to do so on appeal); Becker v. Kroll, 494 F.3d 904, 913
n.6 (10th Cir. 2007) (appellant waived appellate review of issues and arguments
that were insufficiently raised in its opening brief) (applying Fed. R. App. P.
28(a)(9)(A), which is substantively the same as Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9)); Utah
Environmental Congress v. Bosworth, 439 F.3d 1184,1194 n.2 (10th Cir. 2006) (even
where an issue is mentioned in a brief on appeal, it is waived if not substantively
addressed); DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995) (issues not raised on
37

allow Hanson to now argue the professional rescuer doctrine would allow it to
"present its appeals in a piecemeal and repeated fashion/' hoping that the third
time around will be the charm. Hanson, who chose not to argue the point on its
first appeal or to raise it in the Utah Supreme Court, should not be allowed to
stand in a better position than it would have been in had it properly raised it
before and lost.
III.
THE PROFESSIONAL RESCUER DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY
IN THIS CASE IN ANY EVENT.
Hanson apparently concedes that the professional rescuer doctrine does
not apply in this case, since it argues only that it is "[a]nalagous" [sic].68 That is
because, in adopting the professional rescuer doctrine in Utah, the Utah Supreme
Court limited its application to "professional rescuers who, like firefighters and

appeal in the court of appeals and that the court did not address may not be
raised on certiorari unless the issue arose out of the court of appeals' decision);
Ong Ml (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447,445 n.31 (Utah 1993)
(refusing to reach new points raised for the first time on appeal and declining to
honor the distinction between "new arguments as opposed to new issues").
68

Appellants' Br. at 12.

38

police officers, are public employees/'69 Mr. Normandeau was not a public
employee.
The rule also does not apply for another reason. As Hanson notes, the
professional rescuer rule "'bars those engaged in rescue work as part of their
employment from recovering damages for injuries sustained on the job as a result
of the negligence of the person rescued.'"70 As the Utah Supreme Court noted in
adopting the rule, one policy reason in favor of the rule is that the law should not
discourage imperiled citizens from summoning aid.71 That rationale does not
help Hanson because Hanson was not the party in need of rescuing or the party
who summoned Mr. Normandeau. The person rescued was Kristen Marion, the
person who rented and drove the truck, not Hanson.
Hanson argues that, because Mr. Normandeau's "chosen profession is
inherently dangerous," the professional rescuer doctrine should extend to him as
well.72 Yet, as Hanson also notes, "[o]ther inherently dangerous professions
69

Fordham v. Oldroyd, 2007 UT 74,114,171 P.3d 411 (noting that "it is
not necessary to do more to reach the result in this case").
70

Appellant's Br. at 12 (emphasis added) (quoting 57A AM. JUR. 2D
Negligence § 782 (2004)).
71

See 2007 UT 74,18.

72

Appellant's Br. at 13-14.
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include roofers, electricians, pilots, farmers, and construction workers, to name a
few/'73 Hanson's argument would mean that anyone who called any of these
other professionals for help would not owe them a duty either. That is not the
law.74 If an electrician, roofer, or pilot, for example, is injured through another's
negligence, the other is subject to liability to him or her. It should be no different
for a tow truck driver.
Hanson argues that tow truck drivers are surrounded by vehicles moving
at high speeds and are subject to inclement weather, poor road conditions, and
working in the dark at nighttime, "just like highway patrolmen are."75 But while
inclement weather and vehicles moving too fast for conditions caused the state
trooper's injuries in Fordham, none of those "hazardous working conditions" had
anything to do with Mr. Normandeau's death. The hazard that killed him was
not the result of bad weather or other drivers but of Hanson's negligent repair.

73

Id. at 14.

74

See, e.g., Neighbarger v. Irwin Indus., Inc., 882 P.2d 347, 350 (Cal. 1994)
("The duty to avoid injuring others normally extends to those engaged in
hazardous work. Thus, for example, both publicly and privately employed
highway workers, who face the obvious occupational hazard of working in the
middle of traffic, may recover for injuries caused by a third party's negligent
driving.") (citations omitted).
75

Appellant's Br. at 14.
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Hanson argues that, in these "hazardous jobs/' "the pay reflects the
hazards undertaken and expensive workers compensation benefits are
provided."76 Again, Hanson has pointed to no evidence that Mr. Normandeau
was highly compensated for having to face hazards, nor was there any evidence
of "expensive workers compensation benefits." In fact, workers' compensation
benefits are set by statute and represent a trade-off: the worker or his family
receives less than one might expect from a tort recovery in exchange for a speedy
recovery and being relieved of the responsibility of having to prove that the
employer was at fault.77 In any event, the supreme court held in Fordham that the
availability of insurance was irrelevant to its adoption of the professional rescuer
doctrine.78

76

Id.

77

See, e.g., Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp., 350 U.S.
124,140 (1956) (Black, J., dissenting) (one of the early workers7 compensation
acts—that governing longshoremen—was opposed by many workers at first
because they lost "their chance to get big tort verdicts"; but "Congress thought it
best to give them a more certain and less expensive recovery, even though far
less in amount than some tort recoveries might be"); Workers' Compensation Fund
v. Wadman Corp., 2009 UT 18, f 8, 210 P.3d 277 (the purpose of workers'
compensation is to provide compensation to injured employees by a simple and
speedy procedure that eliminates the expense, delay and uncertainty in proving
fault).
78

See 2007 UT 74, ^16.
41

What the court in Fordham did find significant was the nature of the
relationship between public servants such as police officers and fire fighters on
the one hand and members of the public on the other hand: "The nature of the
rescuer-rescued relationship is one that contemplates allocation of costs across
society generally for injuries sustained by professional rescuers/' 79 "Notably,"
the court added,
the consequences for an injured professional rescuer who is a public
employee may be less unfair than those that would befall a private
party . . . because responsible citizens can, and should, see to it that
their public officials fairly compensate those firefighters, police
officers, and others who are called upon to confront hazards as part
of their callings.80
The cost of injuries to employees of private towing businesses are not allocated
"across society generally," the way they are for public servants like police officers
and firefighters. Private tow truck drivers are not "fairly compensate[d]" by
public officials. Extending the professional rescuer doctrine to Mr. Normandeau
would be unfair because it would leave his heirs at the mercy of private charity
while Hanson, the tortfeasor, who has more than sufficient liability insurance to
pay for the damage it has caused, would escape responsibility for its actions.

79

Id. 117.

80

Id.
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As Hanson notes, the court in Fordham barred Fordham's claims since "all
Oldroyd did [was] cause the need for the services of a rescuer/'81 Hanson then
claims "all that can be said [about it] is that the bad repair by Hanson Equipment
caused the need for a tow truck operator to tow" the truck.82 In fact, Hanson's
negligence did more than just cause the need for a tow truck; it created the very
hazard that killed Mr. Normandeau. There was no question in Fordham that the
driver of the car that actually struck Trooper Fordham could be liable for the
injuries she caused.83 Similarly, if a police officer or a tow truck driver were
injured by the fault of another after he arrived on the scene, such as if he were
assaulted, robbed, run over, or had his vehicle hijacked, there is no question that
the party who caused the harm would be liable to him. As the trial court
correctly concluded:
The professional rescuer doctrine also does not excuse
Hanson's liability in this case because the evidence presented at trial
supports the jury's finding that Hanson's negligence not only caused
the [Ryder] truck to break down, requiring that it be towed, but also
created the very hazard that materialized to kill Mr. Normandeau—
81

Appellant's Br. at 14.

82

Id.

83

See Fordham, 2006 UT App 50,15, n.l (before filing the action against
Oldroyd, Fordham settled with the driver of the vehicle that struck him for her
insurance policy limits).
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namely, the built-up torque in the driveline of the truck. The
professional rescuer doctrine does not relieve a tortfeasor from
liability where the tortfeasor's negligence directly caiused the
plaintiffs harm.
(R. 2025, % 34.)
Finally, Hanson argues that California has applied the professional rescuer
doctrine to tow truck drivers. California's experience in applying the doctrine to
tow truck drivers shows why the doctrine should not apply in this case.
In Holland v. Crumb,M a panel of the California Court of Appeals held that
"the 'firefighter's rule' barjred] the claim of a privately employed tow truck
driver who was injured during the normal discharge of his duties at the scene of
a freeway automobile accident." 85 The court based its holding on its view that
the "application of the firefighter's rule depends on the inherent dangers
associated with one's employment" and found that "the risk of being hit from
passing traffic is inherent in the performance of the normal and usual duties of a
tow truck driver rendering aid to inoperable cars which may be stranded on
freeways or streets." 86

84

32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 366 (1994).

85

Id. at 366.

86

Id. at 369-70.
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The California Supreme Court expressly rejected the reasoning of the court
of appeals just three months later, in Neighborger v. Irwin Industries, Inc.87 Given
the California Supreme Court's clear rejection of the rationale for Holland, the
statement by another panel of the California Court of Appeals that Neighbarger
"does not overrule the holding in Holland, "88 while perhaps technically correct,
does not justify this court in following Holland.89
The court in Neighbarger held that private safety employees could state a
claim against a third party whose negligence started a fire that injured them. The
court explored the public policy reasons for the firefighter's rule and concluded
that the policy reasons for the rule in the context of public employees did not
apply in the private sector. The fact that public and private safety officers are

87

882 P.2d 347, 356 n.4 (Cal. 1994) ("We . . . reject the reasoning of the
court in Holland v. Crumb . . . applying the firefighter's rule to the claim of a
privately employed tow truck driver on the theory that a tow truck driver must
assume the foreseeable risks of such hazardous employment.").
88

Dyer v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 85, 88
(Ct. App. 1997).
89

See id. at 89 ("Although the Neighbarger footnote leaves the holding
in Holland intact, we decline to treat Holland as persuasive precedent."). Dyer
itself is distinguishable because the tow-truck driver in that case had a contractbased obligation to provide help to the defendant in case of a mechanical
breakdown. See 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 89. Here, there was no contractual
relationship between Hanson and Mr. Normandeau.
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both employed "to confront and control hazards that may be created by the
negligence of others" does not justify treating them the same: "the firefighter's
rule was not intended to bar recovery for all hazards that are foreseeable in the
employment context, but to eliminate the duty of care to a limited class of
workers, the need for whose employment arises from certain inevitable risks that
threaten the public welfare." 90 As the court explained, a defendant stands in a
different relation to a private safety worker than members of the public stand in
relation to public servants:
When the firefighter is publicly employed, the public, having
secured the services of the firefighter by taxing itself, stands in the
shoes of the person who hires a contractor to cure a dangerous
condition. In effect, the public has purchased exoneration from the
duty of care and should not have to pay twice, through taxation and
through individual liability, for that service. [Citations omitted.]
But when a safety employee is privately employed, a third party
lacks the relationship that justifies exonerating him or her from the
usual duty of care. The third party, unlike the public with its police
and fire departments, has not provided the services of the private
safety employee. Nor has the third party paid in any way to be
relieved of the duty of care toward such a private employee. Having
no relationship with the employee, and not having contracted for his
or her services, it would not be unfair to charge the third party with
the usual duty of care towards the private safety employee. 91

882 P.2d at 354 (emphasis added).
Id. at 355.
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Similarly, Hanson "lacks the relationship that justifies exonerating [it] from
the usual duty of care." It did not provide or contract for Mr. Normandeau's
services, nor did it pay "in any way to be relieved of [its] duty of care" toward
Mr. Normandeau. Even if Mr. Normandeau were publicly compensated, as
firefighters and police officers are, Hanson, as a foreign corporation not generally
doing business in Utah (see R. 104, %% 7-12), would have contributed nothing
towards that compensation. In short, Hanson was not a member of the public for
whose benefit Mr. Normandeau allegedly was undertaking his services.
The California court also noted that another justification for the rulenamely, that it avoids "costly litigation over rights of subrogation without
substantially benefiting the firefighter who is compensated either by the
retirement system or the worker's compensation system"—does not apply to
private plaintiffs: "Our concern to relieve various public agencies of the burden
of lawsuits over rights of subrogation that are pointless because the public fisc
ultimately pays regardless of the outcome, does not apply in the case of private
safety employees."92

92

Id.
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Another contrast between public employees and private ones, such as Mr.
Normandeau, is that "the latter does not receive the speciail pay, disability and
retirement benefits that a public safety officer receives." 93
Finally, the court noted, the "substantial justifications for the firefighter's
rule . . . based on the public nature of the service provided by firefighters and the
relationship between the public and the public firefighter" simply do not apply to
a private employee, such as Mr. Normandeau:
Fire fighting is essentially a government function, and the public has
undertaken the financial burden of providing it without liability to
individuals who need it. Because of the relationship between the
public, the firefighter, and those who require the services of the
firefighter, the individual's usual duty of care towards the firefighter
is replaced by the individual's contribution to tax-supported
compensation for the firefighter. This relationship is missing
between a privately employed safety employee and a third party.
. . . ["]It is the public that hires, trains, and compensates fire
fighters and police officers to confront danger. Basic to the public
policy rationale underlying the fireman's rule is the spreading to the
public of the costs of employing safety officers and of compensating
them for any injuries they may sustain in the course of their
employment. Tire fighters are present upon the premises [where
they can be injured], not because of any private duty owed the
occupant, but because of the duty owed to the public as a whole.'" 94

93

Id.

94

Id. at 357 (quoting Kowalski v. Gratopp, 442 N.W.2d 682, 683 (Mich. Ct.

App. 1989)).
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Thus, n[f]ire fighters and police officers are different than other employees whose
occupations may peripherally involve hazards. Safety officers are employed,
specially trained, and paid to confront dangerous situations for the protection of
society/'95 Mr. Normandeau was not. He was not performing a government
function that the public had undertaken the financial burden of providing
without liability to those served but was doing a job for which those who
benefited from his work would have to pay.
In short, "when a private safety employee seeks to recover against a third
party for negligently inflicted injuries, the relationship between the parties and
considerations of the public good that justify a relaxation of the general duty of
care for public firefighters are simply lacking."96 The court should therefore
reject Hanson's invitation to absolve it of responsibility for its negligence, even if
Hanson had properly preserved for appeal its argument that the so-called
professional rescuer doctrine should apply in this case.

Id. (quoting Kowalski, 442 N.W.2d at 684) (other citations omitted).
Id. at 356.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court properly found that Hanson owed a duty of care to Mr.
Normandeau under the facts of this case. There exists no good reason to relieve
Hanson from liability for the harm its negligent repair of the Ryder truck caused.
The court should therefore affirm the trial court's denial of Hanson's motion for
summary judgment on the issue of duty.
DATED this day of 8th day of December, 2009.
DEWSNUP, KING & OLSEN

By: Paul M. Simmons
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Respondents
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ADDENDUM

52

Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9):
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain
under appropriate headings and in the order indicated:

(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the
contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues
presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not
preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes,
and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a fact finding
must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged
finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on
appeal shall state the request explicitly and set forth the legal basis
for such an award.
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This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
00O00--

Emilv Normandeau, individually
and as guardian for Alex Thayne,
Jacob Thayn, and Hannah Normandeau,
minors; and Lori Normandeau, as
guardian for Daniel Normandeau
and Melissa Normandeau, minors,
on behalf of and for the benefit
of the heirs of Dennis Normandeau,
deceased.
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

No.

20071006

v.
Hanson Equipment, Inc., a corporation
International Truck and Engine
Corporation, a corporation; Bendix
Commercial Vehicle Systems, LLC, a
limited liability company; General
Motors Corporation, a corporation,
by and through its Allison
Transmission Division; Budget Rent
A Car System, Inc., a corporation
fka Budget/Ryder TRS; Summit House
Fine Furniture, L.L.C., a limited
liability company; Dana Corporation,
a corporation; and John Does 1-10,
Defendants and Petitioner.

F I L E D
J u l y 2 1 , 2009

Third District, Salt Lake
The Honorable John Paul Kennedy
No. 020914093
Attorneys:

Colin P. King, Paul M. Simmons, Tawni J. Anderson,
Salt Lake City, for respondents
Melinda A. Morgan, Zachary E. Peterson, Salt Lake
City, for petitioner

On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals

PARRISH, Justice:
INTRODUCTION
i|l
We granted certiorari on the question of whether the
district court's denial of a pretrial motion for summary judgment
is appealable after the trial has concluded and the jury has
rendered its verdict and, if so, whether the pairty appealing the
denial of the motion for summary judgement is required to reraise
the basis for the motion during trial in order to preserve it for
appeal. Regardless of whether the issue on which summary
judgment was denied was reraised during trial, we hold that a
party may appeal a denial of a motion for summary judgment so
long as the basis for the motion was purely legal. We
accordingly reverse the decision of the court of appeals.
FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
f2
Mr. Normandeau, a tow truck driver, was killed as he
prepared a Ryder rental truck for towing. A faulty repair to the
truck's hydraulic hose caused torque to build up in the
driveline. As a result, when Mr. Normandeau disconnected the
driveline in preparation for towing, a portion of the rear
differential broke loose and struck his head, killing him
instantly. His heirs (the "Normandeaus") sued Hanson Equipment
("Hanson"), the company that had performed repairs to the
hydraulic hose shortly before the accident.
i[3
Prior to trial, Hanson moved for summary judgment,
claiming that it owed no duty to Mr. Normandeau as a matter of
law and that its prior repair of the truck was not the proximate
cause of Mr. Normandeau's death. At the summary judgment
hearing, the Normandeaus argued that the question of duty could
be decided as a matter of law, and neither Hanson nor the judge
disputed this assertion. Hanson claimed that it was not
foreseeable that the built up tension in the driveline would kill
a potential tow truck driver. Because there was a question of
fact about whether the faulty repair was a foreseeable cause of
Mr. Normandeau's death, the district court denied summary
judgment. Although the district court was not clear during the
summary judgment hearing or in its subsequent written order about
whether the foreseeability question went to both duty and
proximate cause or just proximate cause, the parties apparently
understood that any disputed factual issues went to the question
of causation rather than duty.1 At trial, the parties disputed

1

Indeed, our precedent is clear that the question of duty
(continued...)
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whether Hanson's repair to the truck was a proximate cause of Mr.
Normandeau's injuries but did not raise the issue of whether
Hanson owed Mr. Normandeau a duty. The jury found for the
Normandeaus and assigned Hanson all of the liability.
f4
Hanson appealed the district court's denial of their
pretrial summary judgment motion on the issue of duty. The court
of appeals held that it could not review the ruling because
Hanson did not litigate the issue at trial and failed to make a
rule 50(b) motion for directed verdict on the issue. Normandeau
v. Hanson Equip. Inc., 2007 UT App 382, HU 13-14, 174 P.3d 1.
The court of appeals explained that it could only review denials
of pretrial summary judgment motions in cases where the litigant
was foreclosed from raising at trial the basis for the motion.
Id. (citing Wavment v. Howard, 2006 UT 56, f 20, 144 P.3d 1147) .
We have jurisdiction to review the court of appeal's decision
pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(a) (2008).
ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW
i|5
We granted certiorari to address two questions:
(1) whether the court of appeals erred in its construction and
application of the rules governing appellate consideration of
challenges to denials of summary judgment on direct appeal
following entry of final judgment and (2) whether the court of
appeals erred in its assessment of the effect of Hanson's failure
to explicitly raise the issue of duty of care at trial after
denial of its motion for summary judgment on that issue.
1J6
" x On certiorari, we review the court of appeals'
decision for correctness, focusing on whether that court
correctly reviewed the trial court's decision under the
appropriate standard of review.'" Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41,
f 12, 164 P.3d 366 (quoting Hansen v. Eyre, 2005 UT 29, H 8, 116
P.3d 290).
ANALYSIS
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IT COULD NOT
REVIEW THE DISTRICT COURT'S DENIAL OF HANSON'S PRETRIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT MOTION
f7
Appellate courts may review the denial of a pretrial
summary judgment motion if the motion was decided on purely legal
grounds. We previously have held that "[i]n appealing a summary

(...continued)
is a purely legal issue. See discussion infra Part I.B.
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judgment ruling, only facts and legal theories that were
foreclosed from being addressed at trial may be heard on appeal."
Wavment v. Howard, 2006 UT 56, K 20, 144 P.3d 1147; see also
Brown v. Jorgensen, 2006 UT App 168, ff 19-22, 136 P.3d 1252
(reviewing the pretrial denial of a summary judgment motion based
on the court's decision not to strike a supporting affidavit, a
legal issue that would be foreclosed from litigation at trial).
However, our case law has been less than clear in defining when
appellate review of denials of summary judgment motions is
precluded. For example, we have sometimes reviewed the denial of
a summary judgment motion when the issue raised was not
subsequently litigated at trial, even though parties were not
explicitly foreclosed from reraising the issue. See Prince,
Yeates & Geldzahler v. Young, 2004 UT 26, f 9, 94 P.3d 179
(considering after trial whether the district court erred in
denying plaintiff's summary judgment motion on the basis that no
contract existed as a matter of law). But we have also held that
if a party has "the opportunity to fully litigate the issues
raised in the summary judgment motions," we will not review the
court's denial of those motions. Wayment, 2006 UT 56, 1 19.
f8
Given the lack of clarity in our prior case law, we
first examine what standard the court of appeals should have
applied in determining whether to review the denial of Hanson's
summary judgment motion. We then apply the standard to the issue
of duty in this case.
A. Appellate Courts May Review Pretrial Denials of Summary
Judgment Motions After Final Judgment Has Issued If the District
Court Denied Summary Judgment on Purely Legal Grounds
^9
On appeal, we will review a district court's denial of
a summary judgment motion when the district court makes a legal
ruling based on undisputed facts that do not maiterially change at
trial. See Estate Landscape & Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v.
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 844 P.2d 322, 326 (Utah 1992).
The district court must deny a motion for summary judgment if it
finds that there is a genuine issue of material fact that bears
on its legal determination or if it finds, as a matter of law
based on the undisputed facts, that the moving party is not
entitled to a legal ruling in its favor. See Utah R. Civ. P.
56(c). Because district courts are not required to specify the
grounds on which they deny a motion for summary judgment, it may
be difficult in some cases to ascertain whether the court denied
a summary judgement motion based on the existence of a disputed
material fact or as a result of a purely legal ruling.
KlO This potential difficulty leads the Normandeaus to
argue that this court should abandon our prior rulings allowing
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us to review pretrial denials of summary judgment in favor of a
bright line rule precluding all appellate review of such motions
unless they are renewed at the conclusion of trial.
Specifically, they argue that by allowing losing parties to
appeal pretrial denials of summary judgment motions, appellate
courts allow the summary judgment motion to become "a bomb
planted within the litigation at its early stages and exploded on
appeal." Holley v. Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Servs., Inc., 835
F.2d 1375, 1377 (11th Cir. 1988); see also Feiger, Collison &
Killmer v. Jones, 926 P.2d 1244, 1249-50 (Colo. 1996).
til Although some jurisdictions have chosen to implement
this bright line rule, others recognize that u [a] critical
distinction exists between "summary judgment motions raising the
sufficiency of the evidence to create a fact question for the
jury and those raising a question of law that the court must
decide.'" Wilson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 56 F.3d 1226, 1229
(10th Cir. 1995) (quoting Ruvle v. Cont. Oil Co., 44 F.3d 837,
842 (10th Cir. 1994)). For example, in order to prevent parties
from challenging summary judgment motions on appeal that were
denied due to disputed material facts rather than on purely legal
grounds, the Eleventh Circuit will not review the denial of a
pretrial summary judgment motion if xx (a) by trial the evidence
produced by the opposing party was sufficient to be presented to
the jury; or (b) by trial the evidence had been supplemented or
changed in some manner favorable to the party who opposed summary
judgment." Holley, 835 F.2d at 1377-78. This rule comports with
our past appellate review of denied summary judgment motions.
Hl2 In Estate Landscape, we reviewed a pretrial denial of a
summary judgment motion when the pretrial judge made a legal
ruling regarding accord and satisfaction that the trial judge
declined to reconsider. 844 P.2d at 325. In that case, it would
have been futile for the losing party to litigate accord and
satisfaction at trial due to the earlier court ruling; no factual
issue at trial would have affected the legal determination.
Thus, we held that the denial of the earlier summary judgment
motion, which had not thereafter been litigated at trial, was
appealable. Id. at 325-26.
Kl3 Similarly, in Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler we reversed a
jury verdict based on an improper denial of summary judgment even
though the legal issue decided by the court denying the motion
was not specifically foreclosed from being litigated at trial.
2 004 UT 26, Uf 12-14. In that case, Prince Yeates sought summary
judgment prior to the trial, arguing that under the undisputed
material facts no contract existed between the parties as a
matter of law. Id. %^ 7-9. The district court denied the
motion. Id. When the case went to the jury, the court
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instructed them that the plaintiffs' oral agreement with Prince
Yeates was a valid express contract. Prince Yeates did not
object to this instruction. Brief of Appellee and CrossAppellant at 37, Prince, Yeates & Geldzaher v. Young, 2004 UT 26,
94 P.3d 179 (No. 20020347). Although nothing in the denial of
summary judgment suggested that Prince Yeats was foreclosed from
litigating the existence of the contract at trial, we reviewed
the pretrial legal ruling and reversed the jury verdict. Based
on the undisputed facts presented in the summary judgment motion,
which remained materially unchanged at trial, we held that the
district court erred in determining that the vague oral agreement
constituted an enforceable contract. Prince, Yeates &
Geldzahler, 2004 UT 26, % 14.
tl4 Purely legal issues are not decided by a trier of fact.
Therefore, while we have stated that we review "only facts and
legal theories that were foreclosed from being addressed at
trial," Wayment, 2 006 UT 56, f 20, we do not require parties to
reargue at trial legal issues that a trier of fact cannot decide.
In both Estate Landscaping and Prince Yeates, the parties would
not have benefitted from the opportunity to litigate the disputed
legal issue at trial since both the existence of an accord and
satisfaction and the existence of a contract in these cases were
legal issues decided by the court. While the Prince Yeates
litigants were not explicitly prevented from relitigating the
existence of a contract, there would have been no benefit to
doing so. Moreover, to allow review of pretrial denials of
summary judgment only when a party is explicitly forbidden from
reraising the legal issue at trial would preclude appellate
consideration of nearly all pretrial denials of summary judgment
motions because "reconsideration of an issue before a final
judgment is within the sound discretion of the district court."
IHC Health Servs. Inc. v. D & K Mgmt. Inc., 2008 UT 73, U 27, 196
P.3d 588.
Hl5 We therefore hold that when a court denies a motion for
summary judgment on a purely legal basis, that is where the court
denies the motion based on the undisputed facts, rather than
because of the existence of a disputed material fact, the party
denied summary judgment may challenge that denial on appeal. Any
time "that reasonable minds could not differ as to the conclusion
to draw from the evidence or that the evidence adduced was simply
insufficient to sustain the legal claim, then the trial court
should rule on the issue as a matter of law." AMS Salt Indus.
Inc. v. Magnesium Corp. of Am., 942 P.2d 315, 320 (Utah 1997).
On the other hand, when disputed facts bear on the decision or
when new material facts emerge at trial that change the nature of
the legal determination, parties then have an obligation to
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reraise the issue at trial in order to preserve it for appeal.
See Hollev, 835 F.2d at 1377.
i[l6 Because we hold that we may review a district court's
denial of a summary judgment motion if the denial was based on a
purely legal issue, we now analyze whether the district court's
denial of Hanson's summary judgment motion is reviewable.
B. The District Court Made a Legal Ruling Based on Undisputed
Facts When It Denied Hanson's Summary Judgment Motion on the
Issue of Whether Hanson Owed Mr. Normandeau a Duty of Care
fl7 Because duty is a purely legal issue for the court to
decide, the court of appeals erred when it determined that it
could not review the pretrial denial of Hanson's summary judgment
motion. The court of appeals held that it could not review the
denial because duty of care is "heavily fact sensitive and is
intertwined with the issue of foreseeability." Normandeau v.
Hanson Equip., 2007 UT App 382, % 14, 174 P.3d 1. The court of
appeals reasoned that the issue of foreseeability bears on both
duty and proximate cause, and thus the district court could not
have ruled on duty as a matter of law. Id.
Il8 In contrast to the court of appeals' assertion that
duty was submitted to the jury in the form of questions
surrounding foreseeability, appellate courts have consistently
held that n[t]he determination of whether a legal duty exists
falls to the court." Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47,
% 14, 143 P.3d 283; see also Rose v. Provo City, 2003 UT App 77,
H 8, 67 P.3d 1017 ("[W]hether a duty of care is owed is 'entirely
a question of law to be determined by the court.'" (quoting
Lamarr v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 828 P.2d 535, 538 (Utah Ct. App.
1992))); AMS Salt Indus., 942 P.2d at 319 (u[T]he question of
whether a duty exists is a question of law." (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Moreover, during the summary judgment hearing,
the Normandeaus agreed that duty would be wdecided by the Court,
as a matter of law" rather than by the jury. Consistent with the
parties' understanding that a denial of summary judgment on the
issue of duty was determined as a matter of law, the parties did
not argue about duty at trial. Still, the Normandeaus argue that
the question of whether Hanson owed a duty to the Normandeaus was
dependent on whether the negligent repair caused Mr. Normandeau's
death or whether he caused his own death by not checking for
built up torque. Although this factual question does implicate
the foreseeability of Mr. Normandeau's death, the specific
mechanism of death is more properly an issue of proximate cause
than one of duty.
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^19 U'A duty, in negligence cases, may b€* defined as an
obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to
conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another.'"
AMS Salt Indus., 942 P.2d at 320-21 (quoting W. Page Keeton et
al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 53, at 356 (5th ed.
1984)). A court determines whether a duty exists by analyzing
the legal relationship between the parties, the foreseeability of
injury, the likelihood of injury, public policy as to which party
can best bear the loss occasioned by the injury, and other
general policy considerations. Id. at 321. uLegal duty, then,
is the product of policy judgments applied to relationships."
Yazd, 2006 UT 47, *h 17; see also Slisze v. Stanlev-Bostitch, 1999
UT 20, fK 9-10, 979 P.2d 317 (finding that a manufacturer had no
duty as a matter of law to inform a consumer that a safer
alternative to its product existed); Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d
149, 151-52 (Utah 1989) (finding that corrections officers owe no
duty of care to the general public because it would be contrary
to the public policy of promoting rehabilitative programs).
120 Foreseeability as a factor in determining duty does not
relate to the specifics of the alleged tortious conduct but
rather to the general relationship between the alleged tortfeasor
and the victim. ''Whether a harm was foreseeable in the context
of determining duty depends on the general foreseeability of such
harm, not whether the specific mechanism of the harm could be
foreseen." Lee v. Farmer's Rural Elec. Coop. Corp., 245 S.W.3d
209, 212 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007); see also Steffensen v. Smith's
Mgmt. Corp., 862 P.2d 1342, 1346 (Utah 1993) ("What is necessary
to meet the test of negligence . . . is that [the harm] be
reasonably foreseeable, not that the particular accident would
occur, but only that there is a likelihood of an occurrence of
the same general nature." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
^21 At times, factual issues may bear on the issue of
foreseeability as it relates to duty, but this is not such a
case. The Normandeaus argue that the district court denied
Hanson's motion for summary judgment on the issue of duty based
on the extensive disputed material facts, relying on several Utah
cases that have allowed the issue of foreseeability as it relates
to duty to proceed to the jury. See Cruz v. Middlekauff LincolnMercury, Inc., 909 P.2d 1252, 1255-56 (Utah 1996); Steffensen,
862 P.2d at 1346 (finding that jury instruction regarding
foreseeability related primarily to proximate cause, though
acknowledging that it could bear on negligences as well); Rees v.
Albertson's, Inc. 587 P.2d 130, 133 (Utah 1978).2 For instance,

2

In Rees, we stated that when there is a dispute about the
(continued...)

No. 20071006

8

when parties disputed whether "special circumstances" existed to
find that the owner of a car who left the key in its ignition had
a duty to a couple injured when the car was stolen, the court
allowed the jury to evaluate the facts. Cruz, 909 P.2d at 125556. If there were such "special circumstances," then the car
owner owed the injured party a duty. Id. at 1256. But in this
case, there is no specific relationship test to be applied to
determine whether Hanson owed Mr. Normandeau a duty. Rather, the
court had the undisputed facts necessary to examine "'the legal
relationships between the parties . . . [and analyze] the duties
created by these relationships.'" Yazd, 2006 UT 47, H ]«
(quoting Loveland v. Orem City Corp. , 746 P.2d 763, 766 (Ml ih
1987))
^22 . :. cnis case, the parties did not dispute that Hanson
repaired che moving truck's hydraulic line, that the hydraulic
line failed, that Mr. Normandeau was called to tow the truck, and
that he was then killed when the driveline hit him in the head.
By denying summary judgment, the district court implicitly found
that Hanson had a duty to avoid creating a hazardous situation
for a tow truck driver. The intertwined questions of fact did
not go to the question of whether Hanson owed a duty to Mr.
Normandeau, biit rather to whether the repair to the driveline was
the proximate cause of his death. Thus, like the losing parties
in Estate Landscaping and Prince Yeates, Hanson would not have
benefitted from reraising the issue of duty at trial. The jury
could not decide the issue as the court had already made a purely
legal determination based on the undisputed material facts. And
no new evidence was offered at trial to undermine the basis for
the court's initial determination.
II, ONCE A PARTY HAS PROPERLY PRESERVED A PURELY LEGAL ISSUE
THROUGH A PRETRIAL MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, IT IS NOT
REQUIRED TO RERAISE THAT ISSUE AT TRIAL IN ORDER TO PRESERVE IT
FOR APPELLATE REVIEW
i|23 Because the district court ruled on summary judgment
that Hanson owed Mr. Normandeau a duty of care Hanson was not

(...continued)
foreseeability of an injury occurring, "the questions relating to
negligence and proximate cause are generally for the fact-trier,
court or jury, to determine." Rees, 587 P.2d at 133. But the
foreseeability discussed in Rees--whether Albertson's could have
reasonably foreseen that breaching its duty not to sell beer to
minors--related to whether Albertson's was the proximate cause of
the resulting accident not, as contested by the Normandeaus,
whether Albertson's had a duty not to sel ] the beer.
9
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required to reraise the duty issue in a motion for directed
verdict in order to preserve its appellate rights. Ml]n order
to preserve an issue for appeal the issue must be presented to
the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an
opportunity to rule on that issue." Brookside Mobile Home Park,
Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, % 14, 48 P.3d 968 (citing Badger v.
Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998)). An issue is
preserved if it is raised in a timely fashion, clearly
identified, and adequately briefed. Id. " [O]nee trial counsel
has raised an issue before the trial court, and the trial court
has considered the issue, the issue is preserved for appeal."
Id. We impose no specific requirement that "a party . . . file a
post-judgment motion before the trial court as a prerequisite to
filing an appeal." Sittner v. Schriever, 2000 UT 45, f 16, 2
P.3d 442 (reviewing grant of partial summary judgment even though
it was not raised in a postjudgment motion).
1]24 The Normandeaus argue that we should require parties to
reraise legal issues decided on summary judgment to give the
court a chance to reconsider them in light of the facts presented
and decided at trial. It is true that "the interlocutory nature
of a partial summary judgment leaves [determinations made in such
motions] subject to modification by the trial court up until the
entry of final judgment." Wayment v. Howard, 2006 UT 56, 1 20,
144 P. 3d 114 7. But raising a legal issue during a summary
judgment motion based on the undisputed facts properly provides
the court with an opportunity to rule on the issue. And once the
district court has an opportunity to consider the legal issue, as
is the case when the motion for summary judgment is denied based
on the undisputed facts that do not materially change at the
subsequent trial, we will not require parties to reraise the same
issue in order to preserve it for appeal. We therefore hold that
by moving for summary judgment on the issue of duty, Hanson
properly preserved that issue for appeal.
CONCLUSION
^25 The court of appeals erred in determining that it
lacked jurisdiction to consider Hanson's appeal of the district
court's denial of its summary judgment motion on the issue of
duty. Hanson was not required to reraise the duty issue at the
close of trial in order to preserve its right to appeal the
district court's decision. We therefore reverse the decision of
the court of appeals and remand this matter to the court of
appeals to consider whether the district court properly ruled
that Hanson owed Mr. Normandeau a duty of care.
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1(26 Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice D u n ant,
Justice Wilkins, and Justice Nehring concur in Justice Parrish s
opinion.
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Defendant Hanson Equipment, Inc. (Hanson) appeals the jury
verdict in favor of Plaintiffs Emily Normandeau, individually and
as guardian for A l e x Thayn, Jacob Thayn, and Hannah Normandeau,
m i n o r s ; and Lori Normandeau, as guardian for Daniel Normandeau
and Melissa Normandeau, m i n o r s , on behalf of and for the benefit
of the heirs of Dennis Normandeau (Plaintiffs).
We affirm.

BACKGROUND
%2
In early 2001, Dennis Normandeau started working as a
mechanic for Kenworth Sales Company, a diesel maintenance and
repair shop and towing service. In May or June 2001,
Normandeau's duties were increased to include working as the
primary wrecking driver. Normandeau's supervisor at Kenworth
trained Normandeau for his new responsibility and taught him how
to use a large diesel wrecker.
%3 On November 10, 2 0 01, Normandeau responded to a call for
roadside assistance after a Ryder rental truck broke down in
Spanish Fork Canyon, Utah County, Utah. The truck had a springapplied, hydraulically-released parking brake system. The
parking or emergency brake was on the driveline behind the
transmission and ran off the power steering unit. The truck
broke down because it had a leak in the power steering line,
which caused the parking brake to engage, preventing the
driveline from turning and causing torque to build up in the
driveline.
%A To tow the truck, Normandeau had to disconnect the driveline
from the transmission. As Normandeau was disconnecting the
driveline, the built-up torque released violently, causing the
differential yoke to break off. Either the differential yoke or
the driveshaft hit Normandeau in the head, killing him instantly.
1(5
Plaintiffs brought a wrongful death action, alleging that
Hanson had earlier repaired the truck negligently, which caused
it to break down. Plaintiffs' lawsuit also included
International Truck & Engine Corporation (ITEC), which was the
designer of the truck's hydraulic system, as well as other
companies associated with the design, manufacture, and lease of
the truck. All of the defendants except Hanson were dismissed
before trial.
%6
Prior to trial, Hanson filed a motion for summary judgment
on the grounds that Hanson owed no duty of care to Normandeau,
that Hanson's repair was not the proximate cause of Normandeau's
death, and that Normandeau was negligent in preparing the truck
for towing. The trial court denied Hanson's motion for summary
judgment, and the case went to trial. The jury returned a
verdict in favor of Plaintiffs. Hanson then filed a motion for a
new trial or, in the alternative, for a remittitur. The trial
court denied that motion, and Hanson now appeals.
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ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
11""./
On appeal, Hanson first asserts that the trial court erred
when it denied Hanson's motion for summary judgment. Because the
issues presented to the trial court for summary judgment were
also presented to the jury at trial, we do not consider this
argument on the merits.
f8
Second, Hanson claims that the trial court erred when it
failed to instruct the jury regarding ITEC's negligent design of
the truck's hydraulic system, which caused the parking brake to
engage and resulted in the presence of torque in the driveline.
"We review challenges to jury instructions under a correctness
standard." Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 429 (Utah 1998)
%9
Third, Hanson asserts that the trial court abused its
discretion when it failed to strike Normandeau's untimely
designation of an expert witness who highlighted material issues
of fact in opposing Hanson's motion for summary judgment. Hanson
further argues that this error was compounded when the trial
court granted Plaintiffs' motion in limine to preclude
Normandeau's supervisor and co-worker from testifying at trial.
"Trial courts have broad discretion in managing the cases before
them
. ." A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen
Constr., 1999 UT App 87, f 11, 977 P.2d 518. Therefore, we
review whether a trial court properly ruled on pretrial
compliance with a scheduling order under an abuse of discretion
standard. See id. We also review the trial court's grant of
Plaintiffs' motion in limine under an abuse of discretion
standard. See Walker v. Hansen, 2 003 UT App 23 7, f 12, 74 P 3 d
635.
KlO Fourth, Hanson argues that Normandeau's counsel made
improper closing arguments at trial and that these improper
arguments warrant a new trial. "[T]he grant of a new trial is
ordinarily left to the sound discretion of the trial court[/
therefore,] we . . . review the court's decision in this regard
under an abuse of discretion standard." Child, 972 P.2d at 429.
ANALYSIS
I.

Summary Judgment

i|ll Hanson first argues that the trial court erred when it
denied Hanson's motion for summary judgment. However, before we
reach the merits of this argument, we must decide, as a threshold
matter, whether we should entertain an appeal of the trial
court's denial of summary judgment after the case was
subsequently resolved by a trial on the merits.
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Hl2 Generally, "[a] denial of a motion for summary judgment is
not a final determination on the merits and, therefore, is not an
appealable interlocutory order." Feiger, Collision & Killmer v.
Jones, 926 P.2d 1244, 1247 (Colo. 1996); see also Heuser v.
Schmittroth, 2002 UT App 42U (mem.) (per curiam) ("The denial of
a summary judgment motion is not final and appealable because it
leaves the case pending. Upon denial of [a] summary judgment
motion, [the losing party] ha[s] the burden to either try the
case or dismiss i t . " ) ; Manuel v. Fort Collins Newspapers, Inc.,
631 P.2d 1114, 1116 (Colo. 1981) (noting that in "most . . .
jurisdictions[,] the denial of a motion for summary judgment is
not a final order which may be appealed but is, rather, an
unappealable interlocutory ruling"). Some jurisdictions,
including Utah, will allow a denial of a motion for summary
judgment to be appealed, but only after the final judgment is
entered in the case. See Manuel, 631 P.2d at 1116; see, e.g.,
Malibu Inv. Co. v. Sparks, 2000 UT 30, 996 P.2d 1043 (reviewing
the trial court's denial of a motion for summary judgment).
However, "[i]n a substantial number of jurisdictions, . . .
reviewability is denied even after final judgment, particularly
where the case has gone to trial subsequent to the denial of the
summary judgment motion." Manuel, 631 P.2d at 1116.x A few

1. See also Lama v. Borras, 16 F.3d 473, 476 n.5 (1st Cir.
1994); Black v. J.I. Case Co., 22 F.3d 568, 570-72 (5th Cir.
1994); Watson v. Amedco Steel, Inc., 29 F.3d 274, 276-78 (7th
Cir. 1994); Johnson Int f 1 Co. v. Jackson Nat'1 Life Ins. Co., 19
F.3d 431, 434 (8th Cir. 1994); Jarrett v. Epperly, 896 F.2d 1013,
1016 (6th Cir. 1990); Holley v. Northrop Worldwide Aircraft
Servs., 835 F.2d 1375, 1377-78 (11th Cir. 1988); Locricchio v.
Legal Servs. Corp., 833 F.2d 1352, 1358-59 (9th Cir. 1987);
Glaros v. H.H. Robertson Co., 797 F.2d 1564, 1573-74 (Fed. Cir.
1986); Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661, 669 (Fed Cir.
1986); Feiger, Collision & Killmer v. Jones, 926 P.2d 1244, 1247
(Colo. 1996); Phillips v. Abel, 233 S.E.2d 384 (Ga. Ct. App.
1977) (holding a motion for summary judgment is moot after the
evidence has been reviewed in a trial on the merits); Evans v.
Jensen, 655 P.2d 454, 459 (Idaho Ct. App. 1982) (explaining that
a final judgment after trial should be tested upon the record
made at trial not at the time summary judgment was denied);
Kiesau v. Bantz, 686 N.W.2d 164, 174 (Iowa 2004) (holding that
after a full trial on the merits the denial of summary judgment
merges with the trial); Skowronski v. Sachs, 818 N.E.2d 635, 638
n.5 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) (stating that no right to review exists
when case has proceeded to trial on the merits, unless the
summary judgment issue was on a different claim than was tried);
Cannon v. Day, 598 S.E.2d 207, 210 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004)
("Improper denial of a motion for summary judgment is not
(continued...)
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jurisdictions provide an exception to this principle and will
allow appellate review of a denial of summary judgment even after
a trial on the merits, but only if the motion for summary
judgment was based on a purely legal question. 2
f13 Utah case law suggests that we will entertain an appea. • ;
denial of a motion for summary judgment only if it involves a
legal issue. In Estate Landscape & Snow Removal Specialists,
Inc. v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. f 844 P.2d 322
(Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court reviewed a denial of summary
judgment after a trial on the merits because the trial court "was
dealing with undisputed facts, [and its] denial of summary
judgment amounted to a ruling of law." Id. at 326. But in
Wayment v. Howard, 2006 UT 56, 144 P.3d 1147, the Utah Supreme
Court declined to review a denial of partial motions for summary
judgment because " [a]t trial, [the moving party] had the
opportunity to fully litigate the issues raised in the summary
judgment motions." Id. ^ 19. Specifically, the moving party
"was allowed to present his evidence and argument on the issues."
Id. The supreme court reasoned that "[i]n appealing a summary
judgment ruling, only facts and legal theories that were
foreclosed from being addressed at trial may be heard on appeal,"
Id. % 20. Thus, our case law suggests that only the legal issues
decided by the denial of summary judgment that prevented a party
from dealing with the issue at tr:i al wil] be considered after a
trial on the merits.
^[14 We conclude that the denial of the motion for summary
judgment is not appealable under prior Utah case law and the
facts of this case. The issue of proximate cause and negligence
were presented to the jury and decided against Hanson.
1.
(...continued)
reversible error when the case has proceeded to trial and has
been determined on the merits by the trier of the facts . .
."
(internal quotation marks omitted)). But see Qndrusek v. Murphy,
120 P.3d 1053, 1055-56 & n.2 (Alaska 2005) (reviewing a summary
judgment denial, but noting that although the Alaska Supreme
Court "has reviewed summary judgment denials" in the past, it
would "give serious consideration in the future to adoption of
what seems to be the majority view concerning reviewability of
summary judgment denials").
2. See, e.g., Wiles v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 173 F.3d 1297,
1301 (10th Cir. 1999); Wolfgang v. Mid-America Motorsports, Inc.,
Ill F.3d 1515, 1521 (10th Cir. 1997); Regency Commercial Assocs.
v. Lopax, Inc., 869 N.E.2d 310, 320 (111. App. Ct. 2007);
Gallegos v. New Mexico Bd. of Educ. , 1997-NMCA-4 0, 11 R, ~ - r ,
3 62, 94 0 P.2d 4 68.
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Certainly, the trial court did not err in declining to rule as a
matter of law that Hanson's negligence was not a proximate cause
of Normandeau's death. The issue of duty, though technically an
issue of law, is heavily fact-sensitive and is intertwined with
the issue of forseeability, which was also presented to the jury
and decided against Hanson. Indeed, Hanson "was accorded the
opportunity to fully litigate [its] case." See id. Finally, and
most importantly, there was nothing preventing Hanson from making
a motion to dismiss at trial on the issue of duty, thus
preserving this issue for appeal. "Consequently, the trial
court's . . . denial [] of . . . summary judgment resulted in no
prejudice[ and] did not affect the final outcome . . . ." Id.
Therefore, we do not review the denial of Hanson's motion for
summary judgment.
II.

Jury Instructions

fl5 Hanson next argues that the trial court erred by refusing to
give its requested jury instruction regarding ETEC's negligent
design of the truck's hydraulic system. Hanson requested that
the jury be instructed on negligent design law and that ITEC be
listed on the special verdict form as a possibLe negligent party
and intervening cause. Hanson submitted Model Utah Jury
Instruction (MUJI) 12.16, which provides: "The manufacturer of a
product that is reasonably certain to be dangerous if negligently
made has a duty to exercise reasonable care in the design of the
product, so that the product may be safely used in a manner and
for a purpose for which it was made." However, the trial court
did not include MUJI 12.16 with the other jury instructions.
Ul6 We review a challenged jury instruction in context with all
other jury instructions provided to the jury. See Jensen v.
Intermountain Power Agency, 1999 UT 10, <fl 16, 977 P.2d 474. "'As
we have repeatedly held, if the jury instructions as a whole
fairly instruct the jury on the applicable law, reversible error
does not arise merely because one jury instruction, standing
alone, is not as accurate as it might have been.'" Id. (quoting
Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732, 741 (Utah 1996)) (citation
omitted). A party is entitled to have the jury instructed on its
theory of the case if competent evidence is presented at trial to
support its theory. See Van Erickson v. Sorenson, 877 P.2d 144,
151 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). However, it is not entitled to have
the jury instructed with any particular wording. See id. As
long as the instructions, read as a whole, fairly instruct the
jury on applicable law, it is not error to refuse a particular
instruction. See id. ("'[I]t is not error [for the trial court]
to refuse a proposed instruction if the point is properly covered
in the other instructions.'" (quoting State v. Sessions, 645 P.2d
643, 647 (Utah 1982))).
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1Jl7 Although MUJI 12.16 was not included in the set of
instructions given to the jury, the trial court provided
sufficient jury instructions regarding Hanson's claim that ITEC
was negligent. For example, in jury instruction 19, the trial
court told the jury that Hanson "claim[ed] that other persons are
responsible for . . . Normandeau's death, including [ITEC] (the
manufacturer of the Ryder truck)" and that Hanson "claim[ed] that
the negligence of these others was the cause of
Normandeau's death."
^f 18

Further , jury insi nn't ion

itvnl:

Although [ITEC] and Plaintiffs reached a
resolution of the issues between them in this
case, [ITEC] still remains as a Defendant in
this action. Thus, it will be your duty to
assess and allocate fault in this matter,
whether that allocation be against: . . .
Normandeau and/or Hanson
and/or against
[ITEC] . . . .
And, jury instruction 23 told the jury that "[ujnless otherwise
stated, all instructions given [to] you govern the case as to
each Defendant. The mere fact that an accident or injury
occurred does not support the conclusion that any party was [at]
fault or negligent."
^19 The trial court went on to define negligence and comparative
negligence without limiting those instructions to Hanson or
Normandeau, and without excluding ITEC. Jury instruction 38, on
comparative negligence, stated in part:
If you decide that more than one person
was responsible for . . . Normandeau's death,
you must decide each person's percentage of
fault. "Fault" means a breach of legal duty
and includes negligence. This allocation of
fault must be done on a percentage basis, and
the total must be 100%. Each person's
percentage should be based on how much that
person's fault contributed to
,
Normandeau's death.
11.'it Finally, in jury instruction 45, the court told the jury:
Hanson . . . ^ d [ITEC] are corporations
and, as such, can act only through their
officers and employees, and others designated
by it as its agents.

20060723-CA

7

Any act or omission of an officer,
employee, or agent of a corporation, in the
performance of their [sic] duties or within
the scope of the authority of the officer,
employees or agent, is the act or omission of
the corporation. So, if you find that the
preponderance of the evidence shows that an
officer, agent, or employee of a particular
corporation was negligent in performing his
duties or within the scope of this authority,
then you must find that particular
corporation was negligent.
1(21 These instructions, when read in context with the trial
court's other jury instructions, adequately informed the jury
that it could find that ITEC was at fault in causing Normandeaufs
death if ITEC had acted negligently. Counsel for Hanson argued
to the jury that ITEC was negligent, and the jury rejected those
arguments. In answer to the specific question, "Was any fault on
the part of [ITEC] a cause of the death of . . . Normandeau?" the
jury answered, "No." Therefore, we conclude that the trial court
did not err in failing to include MUJI 12.16 in the set of
instructions provided to the jury because the other instructions,
taken as a whole, adequately instructed the jury regarding ITEC's
alleged negligence.
1J22 Hanson further argues that ITEC should have been listed as a
potentially negligent party on the special verdict form.
However, ITEC was listed as a potentially responsible party on
the special verdict form. Specifically, the special verdict form
asked the jury, "Was the Defendant [ITEC] strictly liable under
the facts of this case?" and "Was any fault on the part of [ITEC]
a cause of the death of . . ., Normandeau?" The jury answered
"No" to each of these questions. We acknowledge that ITEC was
listed as a party under a theory of strict liability, and not
specifically as a party under a theory of negligence. However,
because ITEC was included as a party on the special verdict form
and because the jury was asked the general question of whether
ITEC was the cause of Normandeau's death and the jury answered
"No," we conclude that any error in not listing ITEC as a
potentially negligent party was harmless.
III.

Untimely Designation of Expert Witnesses
and Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine

1[23 Hanson also argues that the trial court abused its
discretion in failing to strike Plaintiffs' untimely designation
of their towing expert, Jesse A. Enriquez, and that the trial
court erred when it granted Plaintiffs' motion in limine, which
sought to limit the opinion testimony of Normandeau's supervisor
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and co-worker. We conclude that both of these rulings were
within the trial court's discretion.
1|24 First, under the original scheduling order, the parties were
to exchange rebuttal expert witnesses by March 11, 2005. The
trial court later entered a new scheduling order that gave Hanson
until May 31, 2 005, to designate its experts. The revised
schedule did not contain any date for rebuttal expert
designations, and Hanson did not designate any experts before it
moved for summary judgment. Plaintiffs claim that Enriquez was a
rebuttal expert who was used to respond to Hanson's motion for
summary judgment. Upon receiving Enriquez's affidavit, served in
conjunction with Plaintiff's opposition to Hanson's motion for
summary judgment, Hanson moved to strike the affidavit on the
grounds that Enriquez was not timely designated as an expert.
After a hearing on the motion, the trial court denied Hanson's
motion and allowed Plaintiffs to designate Enriquez. It also
allowed Hanson to depose Enriquez and to designate its own towing
expert. Hanson then hired LaMar McQuaid, a towing expert, who
testified at trial on behalf of Hanson
^|25 We conclude that the trial court was within its discretion
to allow Plaintiffs to designate Enriquez as a towing expert and
to allow his testimony as a response to Hanson's motion for
summary judgment. "A trial court has necessary discretion in
managing cases by pretrial scheduling and management
conferences." DeBry v. Cascade Enters., 879 P.2d 1353, 1361
(Utah 1994); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 16 ("[T]he court, upon i ts
own motion or upon the motion of a party, may conduct a
scheduling and management conference."). "Because the trial
judge deals primarily with the parties and the discovery process,
he or she has great latitude in determining the most efficient
and fair manner to conduct the court's business." A.K. & R.
Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr., 1999 UT App 87,
U 36, 977 P. 2d 518. This includes "discretion in determining
whether a violation of a scheduling order warrants sanction,"
id., such as striking Enriquez's expert affidavit, see Utah Pep't
of Transp. v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4, 6 (Utah 1995) (recognizing
that "[t]he striking of pleadings ,. . . [is one of] the most
severe of the potential sanctions that can be imposed upon a
party").
^26 Assuming, without deciding, that Plaintiffs' designation of
Enriquez as an expert was untimely and that Plaintiffs therefore
violated the scheduling order, Hanson was not prejudiced by any
such untimely designation because the trial court gave Hanson an
opportunity to depose Enriquez and to designate its own towing
expert. See, e.g., A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing, 1999 UT App 87,
f 37. Moreover, the designation of the towing experts came well
in advance of trial. Therefore, the trial court did not err in

20060723-CA

9

allowing Plaintiffs' designation of Enriquez as a towing expert.
See id.
1127 Hanson further argues that the trial court erred when it
granted Plaintiffs' motion in limine, which sought to limit the
opinion testimony of Normandeau's supervisor and co-worker.
However, Hanson failed to provide an adequate record to enable
this court to review the trial court's ruling. In their motion
in limine, Plaintiffs argued that the trial court should preclude
Normandeau's supervisor and co-worker from expressing opinions
about the cause of and the responsibility for Normandeau's
accident. Plaintiffs asserted that Normandeau's supervisor and
co-worker were lay witnesses whose opinions were based on
personal perception, lacked foundation, required speculation,
stated legal conclusions, invaded the province of the jury, and
would not assist the trier of fact. Hanson responded by arguing
that Normandeau's supervisor and co-worker provided expert
testimony and that Plaintiffs are not prejudiced by these
individuals providing such expert testimony.
f28 On January 30, 2 006, a hearing was held concerning
Plaintiffs' motion in limine. However, the record before us
provides no transcript of that hearing. Instead, we are only
provided with the minutes, which state that a motion in limine
was argued and that "[t]he [c]ourt rule[d] as stated on the
record." This statement does not provide us with the facts the
trial court considered in making its ruling, the trial court's
basis for granting Plaintiffs' motion in limine, or the trial
court's findings and legal conclusions. The only information
concerning Plaintiffs' motion in limine that the record provides
is that the trial court did, in fact, grant Plaintiff's motion.
1(29 If a party fails to provide an adequate record, we will
assume the regularity of the proceedings below. See State v.
Miller, 718 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986) (per curiam). Moreover, we
note that "'a trial judge is accorded broad discretion in
determining how a trial shall proceed in his or her courtroom.'"
Tschaggeny v. Milbank Ins. Co., 2007 UT 37, % 16, 163 P.3d 615
(quoting University of Utah v. Industrial Comm'n, 736 P.2d 630,
633 (Utah 1987)). As such, we conclude that the trial court was
within its discretion when it granted Plaintiffs' motion in
limine regarding the testimony of Normandeau's supervisor and coworker. See id. (holding that "a trial court is free . . . to
alter a previous in limine ruling, . . . [and to] exercise its
discretion to disregard motions to reconsider prior in limine
rulings" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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IV

Improper Closing Argument

^[30 Finally, Hanson argues that the trial court erred when
denied Hanson's motion for a new trial because of allegedly
improper and prejudicial remarks Plaintiffs' counsel made in his
closing arguments. However, Hanson did not timely object to
these statements at trial. "Absent an objection by [a]
defendant, we will presume waiver of all arguments regarding the
appropriateness of counsel's statements unless the error falls
into the category of plain error." Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839
P.2d 828, 839 (Utah 1992). Hanson does not argue plain error,
nor do we find any plain error regarding Plaintiffs' counsel's
closing argument. Therefore, we do not address Hanson's argument
that Plaintiffs' attorney made improper statements during closing
argument.
CONCLUSION
^31 Regarding Hanson's argument that the trial court erred in
denying its summary judgment motion, we conclude that such a
denial is not appealable under the facts of this case.
Therefore, we do not address it. We further conclude that the
trial court's jury instructions were proper and adequately
informed the jury of the law concerning Hanson's defense.
Moreover, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it allowed the designation of Plaintiffs' expert
and granted Plaintiffs' motion in limine. Finally, we do not
address Hanson's claim that Plaintiffs' counsel's closing
arguments were improper because Hanson failed to object to them
at trial.
1|32

Accordingly, we affirm.

Judith M. Billings, Judge

113 3

I CONCUR:

James Z, Davis, Judge
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ORME, Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part):
i[34 I concur in the balance of the opinion, but I disagree with
my colleagues that there is appellate jurisdiction over only some
denials of summary judgment. I believe that once a final
judgment has been entered, we have jurisdiction over appeals
questioning the denial of a motion for summary judgment
regardless of the basis for the denial, although I recognize that
such appeals will ordinarily be for naught as a practical matter.
^[35 Whatever may be the rule in other jurisdictions, Utah
recognizes that when a party complies with rule 3(d) of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, and designates the final judgment
in its notice of appeal, it is "not precluded from alleging
errors in any intermediate order involving the merits or
necessarily affecting the judgment as long as such errors were
properly preserved."1 Zion's First Nat f 1 Bank v. Rocky Mountain
Irrigation, Inc., 931 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1997). On the
contrary, "[w]hen an appellant files a notice of appeal from a
final judgment, he may, in his opening brief, challenge all
nonfinal prior orders and happenings which led up to that final
judgment." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Professors Wright and Miller specifically recognize that this
familiar precept applies to denials of summary judgment. See 10A
Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary Kay Kane, Federal
Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2715, at 264-66 (3d ed. 1998)

1. I readily agree with the majority that a denial of summary
judgment, an intermediate order, is not immediately appealable as
a matter of right. See Wayment v. Howard, 2006 UT 56, ^ 20 &
n.13, 144 P.3d 1147. While a party may petition to have the
denial considered on interlocutory appeal, it is not required to
do so. See generally Utah R. App. P. 5(a). Utah has a long
history of discouraging piecemeal appeals and favoring a single
appeal from a single action, see, e.g., Anderson v. Wilshire
Invs., LLC, 2005 UT 59, H 9, 123 P.3d 393; Miller v. USAA Cas.
Ins. Co., 2002 UT 6, 1 68, 44 P.3d 663; Kennedy v. New Era
Indus., Inc., 600 P.2d 534, 535 (Utah 1979); O'Gara v. Findlav, 7
Utah 2d 218, 321 P.2d 953, 953-54 (1958), and only rarely will an
interlocutory appeal be granted from the deniail of a summary
judgment motion. When leave is not sought or when it is sought
but denied, the question of whether the intermediate order was
erroneous does not vaporize but is simply pushed forward for
possible consideration after the entry of final judgment.
Adherence to this precept both serves the policy in favor of one
appeal per case and assures litigants there is no need to seek
appeal of every intermediate disposition along the way, as their
right to fuss about such dispositions will be fully preserved for
appeal following the entry of final judgment.
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("[After] entry of judgment following the trial on the merits,
. . . the party who unsuccessfully sought summary judgment may
argue that the trial court's denial of the Rule 56 motion was
erroneous ") (footnotes omitted) .2
^|36 What I have said goes only to jurisdiction--to the power of
an appellate court to consider all interlocutory orders on appeal
from a final judgment, including interlocutory orders denying
summary judgment motions. I do not mean to suggest that such
challenges are likely to be successful. Indeed, as a practical
matter, it will be hard for a party to argue entitlement to
judgment as a matter of law when judge or jury, having heard all
the evidence and seen live witnesses, actually awarded judgment
to the other side. In such a case, the appealing party is
fighting an impossible battle in the absence of a mistake of law
impacting the judgment entered. Even in the case where denial of
a summary judgment motion turns exclusively on a legal issue, it
will ordinarily be more efficient to reassert that legal issue in
the context of a motion to dismiss at the close of the
plaintiff's case, a motion for directed verdict, a challenge to
the trial court's instructions to the jury, etc.--and to seek

2. The majority relies upon Wayment v. Howard, 2006 UT 56, 3 44
P. 3d 1147, in concluding that in Utah "only the legal issues
decided by the denial of summary judgment that prevented a party
from dealing with the issue at trial will be considered after a
trial on the merits." Lead Opinion ^J 13. In Wayment, the Utah
Supreme Court held that "only facts and legal theories that were
foreclosed [by a summary judgment ruling] from being addressed at
trial may be heard on appeal," 2006 UT 56, ^ 20 (emphasis in
original), but it cited no authority in support of that
pronouncement, it did not characterize the limitation as
jurisdictional, and it did not cross-reference the general ru.1e
set forth in Zion's First National Bank v. Rocky Mountain
Irrigation, Inc., 931 P.2d 142 (Utah 1997), which I quote in % 35
of this opinion. Thus, it seems entirely possible that the Court
had in mind the same kind of practical inefficacy of such a
challenge on appeal that I readily recognize, rather than a true
jurisdictional bar.
The majority also relies upon Estate Landscape & Snow
Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States Telephone &
Telegraph Co., 844 P.2d 322 (Utah 1992), where the Supreme Court
did review a denial of summary judgment, see id. at 325-31, but
such reliance is misplaced. The Supreme Court's only relevant:
references were with respect to its determination of the
appropriate standards of review. See id. at 326 ("Because he was
dealing with undisputed facts, [the trial judge]'s denial of
summary judgment amounted to a ruling of law, which we review for
correctness[. ] ") .
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appellate consideration of the trial court's pertinent rulings-than to overtly challenge the trial court's earlier denial of
summary judgment. But such barriers to success on appeal from a
denial of summary judgment are practical, not jurisdictional.
Accordingly, I believe that Hanson was free to raise its
challenge to the trial court's denial of its motion for summary
judgment and that we are obliged to consider that challenge on
its merits, such as they are.
%31 On the merits, I cannot say that the trial court erred in
denying Hanson's summary judgment motion. Hanson's moving papers
failed to establish, as a matter of law, that Hanson owed no duty
of care to Normandeau, that Hanson's repair did not proximately
cause Normandeau's death, or that Normandeau was negligent in
preparing the truck for towing. Accordingly, the trial court
ruled correctly in denying the motion.

Gregory K. Orme, Judge
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Umted States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit
PRINCETON BIOCHEMICALS, INC,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v

BECKMAN INSTRUMENTS, INC,
Defendant-Appellee
No. 98-1525.

summary judgment, and remand the case to determine
literal infringement m light of the correct claim
construction

BACKGROUND
Prmceton is the owner of U S Patent No 5,045 J72 ("the
'172 patent") entitled Capillary Electrophoresis Apparatus
The'172 patent is directed to an apparatus for use in the
process of capillary electrophoresis whereby molecules
and proteins are separated from fluid samples as a result
of application of an electrical charge Capillary
electrophoresis technology itself is not at issue on appeal
Rather, part of the apparatus used m that process is,
namely, the "holder" limitation of claim 32 (emphasized
below m element [6])

Aug 19,1999
32 Capillary electrophoresis apparatus comprising
Before CLEVENGER, RADER, and GAJARSA, Circuit
Judges

[1] a capillary tube of the type which can be electrically
charged,

DECISION
[2] said capillary tube havmg first and second ends,
GAJARSA

*1 Princeton Biochemicals, Inc ("Princeton") appeals the
decision of the Umted States Distnct Court for the District
of New Jersey, No 96-CV-5541, granting Beckman
Instruments, Inc 's ("Beckman's") motion for summary
judgment of noninfringement of claim 32 of Princeton's
U S Patent No 5,045,172 Because the district court
incorrectly construed that claim, we vacate the grant of

[3] first means at said first end of said capillary tube
providmg a source of buffer solution and a source of a
sample substance to be analyzed,

[4] second means coupled to said apparatus for applymg
electrical potential across said capillary tube whereby a
sample flows through said capillary tube and past said
detector,
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[5] said first means includes a rotatable table carrying a
plurality of sample cups and

[6] a holder for holding an end of said capillary tube in
operative relation with one of the said cups, said cups
containing either buffer solution or a sample to be
analyzed,

[7] said capillary tube is in the form of a coil of glass
tubing

[8] wherein said coil of glass tubing is secured to a
support member.

(paragraphing added for clarity). In the claimed apparatus,
fluid samples to be tested (or buffer solutions) are
contained in sample cups, which in turn are placed on a
rotating table to facilitate ease of multiple sample testing.
Each individual sample flows through a coiled, glass
capillary tube secured to a support member, the capillary
tube being held by the holder of element [6] "in operative
relation" with the sample cup. As the sample flows
through the capillary tube, an electrical potential is applied
across the tube and a signal is sent to a detector to
facilitate separation of the various components of the fluid
sample.

The prosecution history resulting in the issuance of claim
32 will be discussed in the context of claim construction
below. Nevertheless, to briefly summarize, claim 32, the
only claim at issue on appeal, issued after
continuation-in-part (CIP) application—claims 1,39, and
40 were combined. Elements [1] through [6] of claim 32

stemmed from CIP application claim 1, element [7]
stemmed from CIP application claim 39, and element [8]
stemmed from CIP application claim 40.

FN1. That a CIP application and not a straight
continuation application was filed is not relevant
to the disposition of this case, as the new
material added to the specification when the CIP
was filed was not directed to the holder
limitation at issue.

*2 Princeton sued Beckman for patent infringement,
asserting that Beckman's P/ACE electrophoresis devices
infringed claim 32 of the'172 patent. The P/ACE devices
consist of an apparatus in which a vertically moving table
and sample cup is "in operative relation" with a stationary
capillary. The parties disputed whether the claim covers
only the embodiment where the holder and the capillary
tube move vertically toward a stationary sample cup and
table, or also the alternative embodiment in which the
sample cup and table move vertically toward a stationary
holder and capillary tube as in the accused devices.

On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court
held a Markman hearing and construed the claim. The
district court interpreted the holder limitation of element
[6] as "requiring] an apparatus equipped with a holder
that lowers the capillary into [the] sample cup before
testing and raises the capillary out of the cup after testing."
Slip op. at 11. In other words, the district court construed
the language "in operative relation" in element [6] to
require "vertical movement of the arm which holds the
capillary" toward stationary sample cups, Slip op. at 14,
rather than vertical movement of the sample cups or the
tray holding the sample cups toward a stationary arm
holding the capillary.
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The district court based its claim construction on the
specification which it found "consistently describes the
arm as a vertically moveable component which would
lower the capillary so as to permit it to come into contact
with the sample cups." Slip op. at 13-14. The district court
also relied on the prosecution history. In particular, the
district court cited the following as support for its claim
construction: (1) the June 2, 1988 office action rejection
over Stevenson, U.S. Patent No. 3,918,913, which
"contains all of the critical elements recited in the
plaintiffs claims: a rotating turntable, a vertically moving
sample probe, etc."; (2) the addition of two new claims
(29 and 30) in response to that rejection that were limited
to a vertically moveable arm and accompanying comments
in the remarks section; (3) a response to the advisory
action of January 31, 1989 stating "the application has
claims which are very detailed as to the apparatus for
raising and lowering a capillary into the sample cups"; and
(4) the cancellation of application claims 22 to 24 that
claimed the alternate embodiment of a stationary capillary
and a vertically moving table and sample cups.

Based on this claim construction, the district court granted
Beckman's motion for summary judgment of
noninfringement. The district court determined that the
accused P/ACE devices did not contain the "exact same
holder limitation" and in fact "d[id] not contain any such
element." Slip op. at 17. The district court further stated
that "[t]he capillary in the alleged infringing device is
stationary; it does not move vertically. Moreover, the
alleged infringing device has no holder for the capillary at
all." Slip op. at 18. As a result of these determinations, the
district court granted summary judgment of
noninfringement— Princeton appeals.

FN2. The district court also granted summary
judgment of noninfringement under the Doctrine
of Equivalents, noting that the accused devices

did not contain an equivalent element to the
holder described in element [6] of claim 32, in
particular an element that would move the
capillaries in and out of the sample cups. Slip op.
at 20-21. Princeton has not appealed the district
court's grant of summary judgment of no
equivalent infringement, and this issue may not
be raised on remand. See Engel Indus., Inc. v.
Lockformer Co., 166 F.3d 1379, 1382-83, 49
USPQ2d 1618, 1621 (Fed.Cir.1999).

DISCUSSION

*3 Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., All U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202
(1986) (summary judgment is proper when no "reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party"). In
deciding whether a genuine issue of material fact exists,
the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party with doubts resolved in its favor. See
O.I. Cory, v. Tekmar Co., 115 F.3d 1576, 1580, 42
USPQ2d 1777, 1779 (Fed.Cir. 1997). We review a grant
of summary judgment de novo. See Conroy v. Reebok
Int'l. Ltd, 14 F.3d 1570, 1575, 29 USPQ2d 1373, 1377
(Fed.Cir.1994).

Princeton argues that the district court erred in construing
element [6], i.e., the "holder limitation," of claim 32. In
particular, Princeton asserts that the district court erred by
requiring a "vertically moving" holder as no such
limitation is present in the asserted claim. Nor, argues
Princeton, were any arguments made during the
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prosecution of the application that resulted in the '172
patent and directed at claim 32 that would support readmg
a vertical movement limitation mto that claim We agree

Claim construction is a matter of law, see Markman v
Westviewlnsti uments, Inc, 52 F 3d 967,979,34 USPQ2d
1321, 1329(FedCir 1995)(enbanc),affd, 517US 370,
372, 116 S Ct 1384, 134 LEd2d 577 (1996), that we
review de novo, see Cvbor Corp v FAS Techs , Inc ,138
F 3d 1448,1456,46 USPQ2d 1169,1174 (Fed Cir 1998)
(en banc)

On its face, element [6] of claim 32 would encompass
embodiments in which both the holder/capillary and the
sample cups/table are vertically movable In order to
narrow the claim as the district court did to require only
that the holder/capillary be vertically movable, the phrase
"in operative relation" must be viewed as sufficiently in
need of clarification to resort to the wntten description as
urged by Beckman See Remshaw PLC v Marposs
Societa' Per Aziom, 158 F 3d 1243, 1248, 48 USPQ2d
1117, 1121 (Fed Cir 1998) ("[A] party wishing to use
statements in the wntten description to confine or
otherwise affect a patent's scope must, at the very least,
pomt to a term or terms in the claim with which to draw m
those statements Without any claim term that is
susceptible of clanfication by the wntten descnption, there
is no legitimate way to narcow the property right") To
clarify what "in operative relation" means, we conclude
that resort to the wntten descnption is permissible m this
case

*4 Beckman urges us to adopt the requirement that the
district court did, namely, that the holder is limited to
vertical movement in relation to stationary sample cups on
a stationary table The portions of the wntten descnption
relied on by Beckman do indeed mdicate such vertical

movement — However, Beckman fails to appreciate the
import of the clear disclosure m the wntten descnption of
the alternate embodiment m which the sample cup and
table move vertically in relation to a stationary capillary
and holder

FN3 "[A] vertical rod 250 [i e , the holder]
which is suitable mounted so that it can be driven
vertically up and down "'172 Patent, col 4, 11
42-43, "[T]he capillary can be inserted mto a
sample cup in table 170 "'172 Patent col 6,11
41-42, "[Mjotor 260 is energized to lower the
arm 240 and the apparatus mcludmg tube 248
mto the cup contammg sample matenal" '172
Patent, col 8, 11 61-63, "[M]otor 260 is
energized to lower the post 240 until the motor is
stopped by its sensor 263 at just the pomt where
the tip of the tube 248 is at about the bottom of
the cup 190 "'172 Patent, col 9,11 15-18
As a modification of the mvention, the apparatus 10 can
be adapted to mclude means by which rather than
raising and lowering the posts 250 and 250' and their
associated apparatus, it raises and lowers either just
specific sample cups or the entire tables 170 and 170'
In this embodiment of the mvention, the motors 210 and
210! would be constructed to both rotate the posts 200
and 200' and to raise them and lower them vertically as
required to raise and lower the tables 170 and 170'
'172 Patent, col 9, 11 50-58 (emphasis added)
Beckman's attempt to minimize the existence of this
disclosure as a "lone sentence" in the wntten descnption
is mentless

Moreover, m the ongmally-filed application which
eventually resulted in the '172 patent as originally filed,
this alternate embodiment was claimed in ongmal
application claims 22 to 24

© 2009 Thomson Reuters No Claim to Ong US Gov Works

Page 5
215 F.3d 1349, 1999 WL 641233 (C.A.Fed. (NJ.))
(Table, Text in WESTLAW), Unpublished Disposition
(Cite as: 215 F.3d 1349, 1999 WL 641233 (C.A.Fed. (NJ.)))

22. Capillary electrophoresis apparatus comprising

first means at said first end of said capillary tube
providing a source of a sample substance to be
analyzed,

said first means including a rotatable table carrying a
plurality of sample cups and a holder for holding an
end of said capillary tube in operative relation with one
of said cups, and

means for moving said table and said holder with respect
to each other so that said end of said capillary tube can
be moved into and out of operative relation with a
sample cup.

23. The apparatus defined in claim 22 wherein said table
is movable vertically up and down with respect to said
holder and is rotatable with respect to said holder.

24. The apparatus defined in claim 22 and including a
vertical post secured to said table and extending
downwardly therefrom, and motor means coupled to
said vertical post for rotating said table and for driving
said table vertically up and down.—

FN4. That claims 22 to 24 were eventually
canceled during prosecution does not affect our
analysis, and the district court erred in attaching
significance to that action in support of its claim
construction.

(Emphasis added.) The originally-filed claims are deemed
part of the original specification. Thus, to the extent that
originally-filed claims 22 to 24 and the written description
at column 9, lines 50-58 describe an embodiment with a
stationary holder and a vertically moving table and sample
cups, Beckman errs in relying solely on those portions of
the written description describing the vertically moving
holder while ignoring those portions describing a
vertically moving table. Absent language in the claim
specifically limiting the phrase "in operative relation" to
vertical holder movement, Beckman cannot find support
for the district court's claim interpretation from the
specification alone.

*5 Beckman, reiterating the arguments used by the district
court in coming to its claim construction, next asserts the
prosecution history to support the district court's claim
interpretation. Beckman argues that the patentee limited
the scope of the claims to vertically moving holders and
stationary tables by amending the claims in response to
prior art disclosing vertically moving tables and stationary
holders, and by arguing in remarks accompanying those
amendments that the invention was limited to that
embodiment. Princeton responds that the amendments
made in response to prior art were directed to claims that
did not result in the issuance ofclaim 32, and that the prior
art cited and interpreted by Beckman would not only
preclude claiming vertically moving sample cups and
tables but also vertically moving holders and capillaries.

A careful review of the prosecution history reveals that
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Princeton is correct Claim 32 resulted from the
combination of claims 1, 39 and 40 as filed m a CIP
application The original patent application contamed 28
claims, to which new claims 29 and 30 were added during
prosecution Claim 1 contamed the holder limitation found
in issued claim 32 Claim 1 was amended m response to
prior art to mclude the vertical movement limitation urged
by Beckman, although the holder limitation itself was
never amended

Eventually, a CIP application was filed m which claim 1
was returned to its original, unamended form Thereafter,
claim 1 was rejected as obvious over prior art However,
claim 1 was not subsequently amended to include any
requirement of vertical movement and in fact was not
amended to distinguish over the cited prior art —

FN5 Claim 1 was amended to include the
limitations of CIP application claim 49 directed
to a T-shaped section of capillary tube inserted
into the capillary tube to supply a source of
cleaning fluid to clean the capillary tube

New claims 31 through 49 were also added when the CIP
application was filed Of relevance to issued claim 32,
claim 39, which depended on claim 1, was directed to a
glass coiled capillary, and claim 40, which depended on
claim 39, was directed to that capillary attached to a
support member Claim 39 was rejected as obvious over
the prior art (the Stevenson patent and an article written by
Rose and Jorgenson) Claim 40 was objected to-but not
rejected-and was deemed allowable if the limitations of
claims 1 and 39 were incorporated The applicant adopted
the examiner's suggestion sequentially, first combmmg
claims 1 and 39 and then later, after final rejection,
mcludmg the limitations of claim 40 The examiner thus
allowed the combmed claim to issue as claim 32 without

any amendment bemg made or any argument bemg
espoused that would limit the holder limitation to the
embodiment where the holder/capillary is vertically
moving m relation to a stationary sample cup/table

We hold that the prosecution history does not limit the
holder limitation of claim 32 to only vertically movable
holders Although the applicant amended claim 1 to
include a vertical movement requirement of the holder m
the ongmal application, the subsequent filing of the CIP
application and the return of claim 1 to its original,
unamended form, counsels against applymg the usual rule
that the entire prosecution history, mcludmg parent and
grandparent applications, be analyzed in interpreting a
claim See Mark I Marketing Cow v Donnelley & Sons
Co. 66 F3d 285, 291, 36 USPQ2d 1095, 1100
(Fed Cir 1995)

*6 We also hold that the applicant did not limit claim 32
to a vertically moving holder during prosecution as the
amendments and arguments cited by the district court were
directed to claims other than those that were combmed as
issued claim 32 See Johnson Woi Idwide Assocs, Inc v
Zebco Cow , 175 F Id 985,992, 50 USPQ2d 1607,1612
(Fed O r 1999) ("carefully-crafted arguments" clearly
directed to certain claims and not others will "avoid
creating ambiguous or adverse prosecution history")
Beckman's reliance on certain amendments and remarks
made by the applicant during prosecution concerning
holder limitations specifically limited to a vertically
movable holder is misplaced Those amendments and
remarks were directed primarily at application claim 8, a
picture claim containing numerous other limitations and
directed to the specific embodiment of a vertically mo vmg
holder, and not to the broader holder limitation m claim 1
that eventually resulted m issued claim 32
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Beckman's reliance on the prior art, in particular the article
by Rose and Jorgenson and the Stevenson patent, also
does not lead to the conclusion that the claims must be
limited to a vertically moving holder. That prior art
discloses embodiments in which capillary tubes, individual
sample cups, and rotatable sample tables are raised and
lowered. If those combined teachings preclude claiming
vertically moveable sample cups and tables as Beckman
urges, then those teachings should also preclude claiming
a vertically movable holder. Thus, Beckman's
interpretation of the prior art would preclude claiming any
apparatus having any vertical movement whatsoever.

In summary, neither the written description nor the
prosecution history provides any support for Beckman's
assertion that the phrase "in operative relation" in the
holder limitation must be limited to vertical movement of
the holder. Thus, the district court erred in its claim
construction. The proper interpretation of the holder
limitation is that "in operative relation" encompasses both
vertical movement of the holder as well as vertical
movement of the sample cups and the table.

device has no holder for the capillary at all," Slip op. at
18, this finding was based on an incorrect claim
interpretation and thus cannot stand.

CONCLUSION

*7 For the foregoing reasons, the district court's grant of
summary judgment of noninfringement of claim 32 of
Princeton's '172 patent is vacated and the case is remanded
for a determination of literal infringement in light of the
correct claim construction of the holder limitation.
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Finally, Princeton urges that if we are to reverse the
district court's claim interpretation, as we have done, we
should also grant summary judgment of literal
infringement as the P/ACE devices contain a "holder" in
the form of either the cartridge which houses the coiled
capillary tube itself or the plugs which seal the capillary
tube ends to the cartridge wall at the inlet and outlet
openings. Beckman asserts that this is inappropriate as the
district court dismissed Princeton's motion for summary
judgment of infringement as moot and thus is not before us
on appeal. We agree with Beckman. In this case, the
proper disposition is for us to remand the case to the
district court to determine the issue of literal infringement
in light of the correct claim interpretation. Although the
district court determined that "the alleged infringing

© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

